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LEARNING
AND LEADERSHIP
A STUDY OF THE NEEDS AND
POSSIBILITIES OF INTERNATIONAL
INTELLECTUAL CO-OPERATION

BY ALFRED ZIMMERN

ἥ δ' ἐκ πλειόνων κωμῶν κοινωνία
τέλειος πόλις ἥδη, . . . γινομένη μὲν
τοῦ ζῆν ἔνεκεν, οὖσα δὲ τοῦ εὖ ζῆν.

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*Man's needs and desires have brought
about a world-wide civilization. His
next task is to discover its institutions.*

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PREFACE

THE following pages, as their sub-title indicates, were originally written for submission to two Committees of the League of Nations concerned respectively with the educational and more general aspects of what has come to be known as international intellectual co-operation.

Their circulation in the form of a memorandum led to numerous requests that they should be made more generally accessible, and permission has therefore been obtained to enable this to be done. They are reproduced from the original text practically without alteration, except as to one point on which I am indebted to a suggestion from Madame Curie.

The original plan for this short essay on a vast subject contemplated a wider treatment of remedial agencies than will be found in the second chapter. I had intended to append to the discussion of education and intellectual co-operation a treatment of the more strictly political problem, or, in other words, of the adaptation of political democracy to post-war conditions. As this did not come within the framework of the memorandum, I reserved it for separate treatment in the form of a paper for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, to be published in that Institute's Journal for May 1928. To that I must refer those of my readers who may feel that, in emphasizing the importance of Learning and Leadership, and of their association, for the maintenance or recovery of our civilization, I have done less than justice to the indestructible moral

forces associated with the past traditions and present working of popular government.

My first intention was to issue this volume to readers in the United States with a special introduction emphasizing and developing some of the points likely to be of special interest to them. But I have decided to abandon the project, for two reasons: Firstly, because the volume as it is was written quite as much for Americans as for Europeans, the United States having from the beginning been represented, and very ably and actively represented, on the League of Nations Committee chiefly concerned with its subject-matter. Secondly, because if I began to put down what I have to say in amplification of the brief allusions to American conditions in the text, I should soon find myself writing another volume. That, no doubt, I ought to do: for when one has something to say it is best to say it. But it will be in a more independent form than that of an introductory note.

A. Z.

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I

THE NEW ENVIRONMENT AND THE PROBLEM OF ITS CONTROL

CIVILIZATION is control over environment. A civilized man is a man who understands the world in which he is living and the forces by which it is moved, whilst a savage is a plaything of arbitrary and capricious powers, acting beyond the limited range of his intelligence. A civilized society is a society equipped with the knowledge to control its environment, whilst a savage society for the lack of such knowledge remains steeped in what is rightly termed barbarism. The criterion is not ethical or aesthetic, but intellectual and practical. The savage may be and, according to travellers' reports, often is, or has been, as virtuous in his customs and as refined in his sensibilities as the average modern town-dweller, whilst the records of civilized communities bear plenteous witness to the moral depravity which may accompany high intellectual attainments and wide information. There is no doubt an inner connexion between intelligence and virtue: both are related to the order which is the ultimate condition of all human affairs. Of that order civilization, which is the work of practical intelligence, is only one, and perhaps not, in the last analysis, the most important manifestation. Religion, conduct, culture, beauty, all have their place. The gods, according to Aristotle, need no civilization. They dwell in a realm superior to it. Yet from his day onwards, Europe has accepted the Greek contention that civilization, or a controlled and orderly external environment, is an indispensable condition of human happiness; and this element

in the European tradition is perhaps that which the societies of other continents have been the most ready to accept.

It is not, therefore, necessary to argue in favour of the study of the present-day world. Such study is an elementary duty of good citizenship. Public opinion is the life-blood of a civilized community. The Athenian spent a good part of his day in the Agora discussing what he called the Common Thing (*τὸ κοινόν*), the political interests which he shared with his fellow citizens, whilst the same term in its Latin dress (*res publica*) expresses for us more clearly than the balder appellation 'The State' the intimate association which such interests involve for every member of the body politic. A common concern for the republic (*idem sentire de republica*) has been, in all ages of civilization, one of the closest ties between man and man.

The problem which confronts us is not whether it is our duty to study the world in which we live—the duty is undeniable—but *what is that world?* What is that which is common to us as civilized beings? What is our *res publica*?

At the moment when Aristotle was teaching that the City-State was the final form of association, embracing all others, his Macedonian pupil was making havoc of his doctrine and opening up new perspectives in the art of government. Yet the old theories lived on, though they had lost their vitality, because men found it hard to realize what was happening under their own eyes. We see much the same thing to-day. The world war, bringing to a sudden culmination the development of a century, has extended our field of study from the local plane to the international. The *res publica* with which it is our duty to concern ourselves, if we wish to retain control over our environment, extends to the ends of the earth. The political interdependence of the world is the most important fact in the post-

war international situation. But our eyes, accustomed to a miniature canvas, obstinately resist the enlargement of scale. Our minds refuse to make the innumerable necessary adjustments. It is easier to continue in the pre-war groove, making here and there a small verbal concession to the ideal of a League of Nations, than to banish old habits in the light of new conditions and to face the whole problem afresh. Yet this, and nothing less than this, is necessary if human society is to remain civilized. For if there is one clear deduction to be drawn from the events of the last few years, it is that statesmanship has not yet recovered the control which it finally relinquished in 1914 over the fluid and tumultuous interaction of human wills and passions which we like to describe fatalistically as 'events'.

That control can never be recovered by the unaided action of statesmen: for statesmen, however wise and farsighted, are limited in their policies by the public opinion and the parliaments to which they are responsible. If we are drifting back to barbarism, the root of the evil is not political but intellectual. It is because the peoples do not understand the problems of the post-war world that their statesmen are unable to control them. History will no doubt call individual statesmen of this generation to account for many incidental shortcomings. But it will not be forgotten in their defence that, at a moment when civilization was in collapse, they established a League of Nations as an outward and visible symbol of the new order to which the peoples were to attune their minds.

It is undoubtedly in some respects a misfortune that the League of Nations was permitted to come so easily to birth. Other great political ideas have been accepted after generations of intellectual effort and explanation: but, once victorious, they found a world adapted to their influence. Thus the great collective movements we describe as the

Reformation, the Renaissance, the French Revolution, like some of the national movements which came to fruition in the late war, had a long and familiar intellectual record before they reached the stage of practical realization. By a strange irony of history exactly the opposite fate has been reserved for the grandest and most difficult of all political ideas. Unknown to the general public in 1914—a public that fought elections on questions of Socialism, Nationalism, Suffrage, and Customs Tariffs—its very unfamiliarity has enabled it to win the acceptance of some fifty Governments and peoples who have hardly even yet begun to grasp the significance of the document to which they have given their names. They have welcomed it as a symbol of the possibility of human betterment and as a centre of practical activity. But they have not yet realized the incompatibility between their Utopian hopes and the modest reality. Still less do they appreciate that, in the present state of public opinion, the League itself must necessarily partake in some measure of the defects of the old order. For how can it grapple seriously with the task of recovering control over civilization when the Governments who compose it are still hampered by pre-war intellectual traditions?

Thus, in spite of the establishment of the League, statesmen still find themselves limited to a policy of drift. Their opportunist expedients are indeed accompanied by idealistic professions of faith in the new order. But, however well-meant, this 'fine literature', as a candid statesman has lately described it, probably does more harm than good. For it accustoms the public to regard the discrepancy between an international outlook and political realities in much the same way as it has for centuries regarded the discrepancy between Sunday precepts and week-day practice.

If the idea for which the League stands is not to perish

owing to the difficult conditions under which it has been realized, two things are urgent. Statesmen must have the courage to make clear to their peoples that the League is not doing, and cannot do, the work for which it was created because its intellectual foundations have not yet been laid. And all those whose activity lies in the realm of the intellect must set to work to lay those intellectual foundations.

If these two tasks are not undertaken, and undertaken soon, the present drift will end in disaster. For peace is not maintained at this moment by the will of the peoples, giving moral authority to the League. It is maintained by exhaustion, by poverty, and by fear. These are not the bulwarks of a true civilization. They are rather the characteristics of a society of barbarians.

Politics is medicine applied to the body politic. As the art of the physician consists in the skill to diagnose and to treat the maladies of the individual sufferer, so the art of the statesman consists in the skill to diagnose and to treat the maladies of the body politic. And, just as in a well-educated community the individual citizen has sufficient knowledge of personal hygiene to maintain himself normally in good health, so in a well-ordered political system the individual citizen should have sufficient knowledge of public affairs to frame a sound judgement on the general condition of the state.

The analogy may be carried further. Just as the training of a doctor consists partly of a study of the organs and elements of the body, and partly of a study and practical experience of its living reactions and manifestations, so the process by which a citizen forms a sound judgement on public affairs is compounded of his knowledge of the permanent elements and traditions of his country and of his experience of its life and movements at the particular

moment. Just as clinical experience is of little value without a knowledge of anatomy, so knowledge of the details of a given political problem or situation is of little value without a mastery of the more permanent and fundamental factors involved.

Thus politics, like medicine, has both its dynamic element and its static element. And of these the static is the more important, for it underlies the other. Many a surgeon has failed to save a patient's life because, in ensuring the 'success' of his operation, he overlooked certain permanent elements in his constitution. And many a statesman has embarked on an unwise policy because, misled by superficial manifestations, he ignored powerful but invisible forces which played a far more significant part in the life of his people.

It is on this power of diagnosis, widely diffused among the general population and exceptionally developed among its chosen leaders, that the system of democratic self-government reposes. It implies a tacit collaboration between general education and special knowledge, between the plain man and the specialist. Both are familiar with the general conditions of the life of the community: and the plain man, in entrusting his confidence to the specialist, knows that the latter's judgement on a particular issue will be merely the technical application of principles and traditions shared by both. That confidence would not be so freely given if the plain man were not aware of the exact limitations of his own knowledge and of his own ignorance. It is because he knows precisely what he needs from the specialist that he retains his power to control him. Knowledge is power; and it is the great body of knowledge common to the plain man and the specialist, a far more important body of knowledge than that possessed exclusively by any individual specialist, which has enabled the democratic system in parts of Europe, America, and Australasia to become a living reality.

It is this general body of knowledge, this familiar experience of the *res publica*, which both statesmen and citizens in the post-war world find to be no longer at their disposal. The enlargement of scale has not only confronted them with specific new problems about which they know that they know little or nothing: that is a difficulty with which they could contend by the employment of specialists; it has also disarranged all the data on matters which they had hitherto believed to be in their competence, and thus undermined their normal faculty of judgement. When everything has to be thought out afresh to accommodate new factors on which no sure judgement can be formed, when what is still called 'foreign policy' introduces an incalculable *x* into every attempted reckoning, politics cease to be a science and degenerate into a gamble. The physician tends to make place for the medicine-man. Not only democracy, the latest and widest development of scientific government, becomes impossible, but Government itself is impossible. With the seas on which it is sailing uncharted, the ship of state cannot be steered. It can only drift.

Thus the study of the new and wider *res publica* is indispensable to the survival of the art of government. Until the citizen has become familiar with the anatomy and physiology of that larger world and accustomed to apply to its manifestations the same quality of judgement that he has learned to apply within the narrower range, the democratic system will not have recovered the control which it has lost. Or rather, it will retain the control which it exercises at present—the power to veto politics based on a diagnosis of the larger world because they do not harmonize with the conceptions natural to minds still dwelling in the smaller. This sabotage by democracies of the plans of those who, in normal circumstances, would be recognized

as their natural leaders, is one of the most familiar, as it is one of the most tragic, phenomena of an age of transition such as that in which we are living.

An examination of certain characteristics in which the new *res publica* differs from the old will perhaps usefully illustrate the argument.

Public affairs to-day differ from the public affairs of a generation ago in three main respects: their scale, their complexity, and the pace at which they move.

I. The enlargement of scale has already been emphasized. It will be sufficient to adduce a few obvious examples.

The question of peace and war used to be regarded as a matter for the decision of individual peoples and parliaments. Men were familiar with local wars or with wars involving perhaps a whole continent. There had never before 1914 been a World War. In fact, the belief that war was a force which could still be localized was one of the causes which led to the outbreak of hostilities in 1914. To-day, by the Covenant of the League of Nations, under which over fifty States have pledged themselves both to go to war and to abstain from war in certain contingencies, war has been delocalized. In reflecting on the issues of peace and war, the citizen of a State which is a member of the League must fix his eyes on the larger canvas, not the smaller. 'Private war', as it has now come to be called, has been curtailed, if not wholly abolished. War has become *res publica*: and 'public' in this connexion bears the significance of world-wide or universal.

It may, indeed, be argued that the peoples may not act up to the engagements that they have contracted and that, therefore, limited wars may still occur. To this it may be replied that the causes which developed a world-war out of a dispute between two States in 1914, at a time when the

Covenant of the League was not in being, still continue to operate and are, indeed, stronger than they were at that time. Our choice then, in all probability, lies not between a local war and a general war, but between a public war and a private war on an equal scale and of a more disastrous character.

Questions of finance used to be regarded as incontrovertibly within the domain of individual Governments and peoples. Indeed, no privilege has been valued more highly by democratic peoples than what has been called 'the power of the purse'. During the last few years we have come to realize that that power has been gradually withdrawn and transferred elsewhere. Where it resides to-day this is no place to inquire; but that it is on the international plane rather than on the local needs no argument. Problems of currency, of inter-governmental assistance to embarrassed Governments, such as those aided by the League of Nations, of credits to municipalities, public utilities, or ordinary enterprises in countries in need of capital—all these, which cut most deeply into the social economy of the countries concerned, have been dealt with, not by the independent action of national parliaments but on the newer and larger plane. The citizens of all these countries, in attempting to form a judgement upon them, have found themselves transported into regions quite beyond their normal experience.

A third class of questions which has been irrevocably transferred to the wider realm consists of problems arising out of the modern commercial and industrial system. There, indeed, we come upon the most striking instance of the maladjustment between the mind of the citizen and the issues that he is called upon to face.

During the last six or seven generations, since the great inventions at the end of the eighteenth century, the economic life of mankind has become organized on an

international plane. First Britain and then one Western country after another abandoned the ideal of self-sufficiency and embarked on a career of manufacturing for export. Simultaneously, countries less well equipped for industrial organization but possessing foodstuffs, raw materials, and metals, developed extensive trade relations with manufacturing centres. Thus there grew up, out of innumerable individual relationships, a world-wide system of economic interdependence. The manufacturing countries, importing from overseas the raw materials from which capital, management, and labour alike drew their livelihood, drifted into a condition of dependence upon the lands of primary production, while the latter in turn were exposed to impoverishment if their normal market ceased to be open to them. Both alike depended on the maintenance of liberty of access by sea for their commodities.

The deep significance of this economic interdependence which has grown up during the nineteenth century only became fully apparent during the years of the war, when it was temporarily in abeyance. It was then realized, and with special poignancy by the populations in the area blockaded by Allied sea-power, that what had grown up as an economic system to meet the needs of individual producers and consumers, was a political and strategic factor of the first importance. It is perhaps not too much to say that it has definitely led to the supersession of military power by sea-power as the controlling element of physical force in the world's life; for there is no region on the earth's surface where a general staff can equip and maintain an efficient modern armed force without access to oversea resources. By industrializing itself, a modern state not only becomes an integral part of an international economic system: it also gives hostages to distant communities, which it is not within its power to coerce. This holds true of

every industrial power, from the smallest to the greatest, from those with large colonial possessions to those with none. For the passing of the undisputed naval supremacy of a single Power, consummated at the Washington Conference of 1921, has practically coincided with the more general recognition of the economic implications of sea-power.

It might have been expected that the striking object-lessons provided by the war would have revolutionized the political discussion of economic issues. The blockade had brought the international character of the economic system home to the meanest intelligence. And if the system is international the remedies for its shortcomings must naturally be looked for in the main, at any rate, in the same sphere. Nevertheless, such is the force of habit and intellectual inertia that the cessation of the blockade led almost everywhere to a revival of nationalist economic ideas and expedients. Allowance must, of course, be made for the peculiar difficulties of the moment. But it remains true that, had the statesmen and peoples been able to regard more broadly the economic problems confronting them, the history of the years following the Armistice would have been utterly different and an immense amount of human suffering would have been averted. As it is, the statesmen and peoples, with minds ill-adjusted to the problems before them, have fumbled from one hap-hazard expedient to another, with the result that, as they are now discovering, the real power is passing into other hands.

For the economic system, with its wide range of experience and interest, has brought into existence a body of leaders of its own. Whilst in the political sphere the men with whom decisions rest have been confined within the comparatively narrow limits of individual States and their local controversies, the men whose abilities have raised them to positions of economic leadership live and work

with the vision of the wider world constantly before their eyes. It is true that they are not in the strict sense statesmen: their loyalty is not to the people as a whole, to the *res publica*, but to the directors and shareholders of some *res privata*. Nevertheless, the nature of their activity is often more in harmony with the vital forces of the age than that of their political *confrères*. Moreover, the qualities to which they owe their positions are often more truly political than those which secure victory at an election or a seat in a Cabinet. Prudence, foresight, patience, judgement, diligence, knowledge of human nature are as much at home at a directors' meeting as in a legislative assembly. It is, therefore, not surprising that the best talent of the younger generation, with its keen eye for what is genuine and vital, is attracted into the economic career, and that the peoples are becoming accustomed to look to independent bankers and business men, rather than to their chosen leaders, for salvation.

If this tendency is not corrected, it will spell the end not only of democracy but of free government. For the domination of representatives of *res privatae*, however benevolent and however carefully veiled, is an irresponsible dictatorship and a negation of modern conceptions of government. There is no way out but to bring into the service of *res publica* the wider outlook, broader experience, and better training, found in the best representatives of *res privatae*.

What we are witnessing is a race against time. The world is equipped with an international economic organization. This organization, brought into existence for self-regarding purposes, has, through its efficiency, been enabled partly to fill the gap created through the absence of an international political organization backed up by an educated public opinion. Can this public opinion be brought into existence in time to arrest the downfall of free government?

II. The enlargement of the scale of public affairs has been accompanied by another phenomenon which at first sight might seem incompatible with it—an increase of complexity. The statesman of to-day needs not only a telescope, to survey wide horizons, but a microscope, to examine into intricate local situations.

In reality, the two tendencies are not antithetical but complementary. They have been associated during the whole history of the last century. If the enlargement of scale can be traced back to the Industrial Revolution, which made the natural resources of the world more available, the increase of complexity can be traced to the French and American Revolutions, which gave a new stimulus to national and individual self-consciousness.

Thus, while the last hundred years have witnessed an increase of uniformity in the material sphere, through the spread of railways, telegraphs, and other conveniences to the ends of the earth, they have also witnessed a steady process of differentiation and self-assertion on the part of nations and other social groups, as in the life of the individual himself.

One symptom of this is the increase in the number of European States since the war. Another is the remarkable increase in the number of literary languages. Still another is the reinforcement of the citizen body by the widespread granting of the suffrage to women.

All this has added to the difficulties of political diagnosis. And these difficulties will, in the nature of things, grow continually greater. Herbert Spencer defined social progress as a movement from homogeneity to heterogeneity. The Europe of Metternich's day was a more homogeneous material for the political art than the Europe of to-day with its awakened nationalities. The Asia of to-day is assuredly more homogeneous, for political purposes at any rate, than

will be the Asia of to-morrow; and Africa, too, holds in store diversities of which the statesmen of coming generations will have to take account.

Here again the statesmen and the peoples have not yet adjusted their minds to the new realities. Men continue to deal with problems, and especially international problems, in the rough, ignoring the finer details which are sometimes all-important. Instance after instance could be cited in the history of the last few years in which international relations have been embittered and golden opportunities allowed to slip by, through the failure to appreciate the subtler and more delicate elements involved. The relations between Europe and the United States form one striking example. Europeans, even Europeans in important positions, have taken no pains to look beneath the surface of American life to its more intimate psychology or to understand the relationship between the populations of the Atlantic seaboard and those of the Middle West, or the attitude of the Executive and of Congress towards public opinion. Americans, on the other hand, have been equally superficial in seeing European conditions through American spectacles and overlooking those vital old-world factors on which Europeans seldom expatriate because they take them for granted. Equally chilling treatment has been meted out, on particular occasions which students of international affairs will recall, to Germany, France, Italy, and Poland—to mention none but leading European States—whilst it will be admitted that the collective policies adopted towards Russia, China, and the Moslem world have not been characterized by psychological insight.

A more dramatic instance of the same kind of intellectual laziness was provided by the abortive meeting of the League Assembly in March 1926. Public opinion in various nations confidently looked forward to certain results. Those results

proved unattainable because elements in them were mutually incompatible. This simple fact was not understood because the psychological situation was more complicated than any of the parties involved in it realized. Thus, when the statesmen came together to find a solution they laboured in vain: for the keys for which they were seeking were dispersed throughout the world—in London, Paris, Berlin, Warsaw, Stockholm, Madrid, and Rio de Janeiro. There was a tendency on the part of critical onlookers to denounce this or that party to the controversy as 'unreasonable'. The word was ill-chosen. The obstacle to a settlement was not that the parties were unreasonable, but that they had reasoned too much, and in isolation. Their reasonings had led them to arrive at policies of their own, no doubt in the light of inadequate data, and they were not inclined lightly to abandon their deliberate opinions. In a simpler and less self-conscious world, such as that of the Holy Alliance, a group of statesmen sitting round a 'board of green cloth' could agree to impose uniform policies upon the puppets they ruled. To-day the world has become too much alive, and therefore too complicated, to be managed from a single centre. The peoples are thinking and feeling for themselves according to their own temperaments and in the light of their own knowledge and experience. They are not unreasonable. They will listen to leaders who have won their confidence or to teachers who have made the effort to enter into their minds and understand their particular situation. But they will not be driven, or cajoled, or lectured to by critics who stand aloof, sometimes even failing to recognize that there is any problem of understanding involved at all.

III. But perhaps the most disconcerting feature of the post-war world is the rapidity of its reactions. It is as though the body politic had equipped itself with a new nervous system with responses ten times more rapid than of

old. In the world before the war it was a common maxim of statesmanship that political causes were slow in producing their effects. David Ricardo, when asked whether his knowledge of political economy had not been useful to him in business, is said to have replied that the chief advantage he had over his competitors was in his realization that economic laws worked more slowly than they realized. That 'the mills of God grind slowly' is a philosophy underlying the whole work of the historical school of the nineteenth century. It has become a staple element in general education, as in legal and other forms of professional training, in the English-speaking and numerous other countries. It has entered deeply into public opinion, fashioning the processes by which the reflective voter arrives at a judgement on a given issue. It has, in fact, done more than induce an intellectual habit. It has diffused among wide populations a sense of what is the natural and necessary rhythm of public affairs.

This rhythm was rudely interrupted by the war. But the peoples, with their instinct for conservatism, regarded the war as an interlude and looked forward to a return to the normal pre-war condition. They have not even yet understood that the life of the world has entered upon a new phase in which the older and more spacious modes of calculation are of no avail, and have become positively misleading. Events have indeed followed one another so rapidly since the Armistice that an onlooker, trained in the older school, might well fail to see their inner connexion and relapse into fatalism. But in truth the guiding thread is there and he who will can master it. But for such mastery there is required a deftness, an adaptability, an open-mindedness, as well as a fund of knowledge and experience, for which public affairs before 1914 afforded small preparation. Thus it is that the record of European public

opinion since the Armistice has been that of a breathless and belated scramble to catch up with the movement of events. And the public has been constantly outdistanced.

Looking broadly over the history of the years since the Armistice it may be said that virtually every important new international development, calling for measures of practical statesmanship, has been unsatisfactorily dealt with because public opinion was not given enough time to understand what was happening or what was required. It is enough to cite successively the end of hostilities, with the new moral and new economic opportunities that it offered: the problem of reparations; the situation created by the withdrawal of the United States; the formation of the first regional agreements in 1921; the problem of inter-allied debts; the currency and fiscal problems; the problem of a general system of arbitration and security; the problem of the control of armaments; and the problem created by the flow of American capital into Europe. On the speed with which events have outdistanced statesmanship in Russia, in China, and in the Near East there is no need to dwell. We have only to cast our minds back some twenty years, and to ask ourselves how many generations we should then have estimated for the developments that have taken place.

It may be argued that this increase in the pace of events is merely a temporary phenomenon due to the disturbing influence of the war. But, if that were so, we should now be witnessing a slowing-down. But in fact there seems, if anything, to be an acceleration. The cause must be looked for in a deeper region: for the war itself was a symptom of the same nervous condition. To trace it to its roots would carry us too far. Suffice it to say that the phenomenon must be accepted as a permanent element in the new phase of the world's history on which we have entered.

II

THE RECOVERY OF CONTROL

HOW is mankind to recover control over 'events'? The problem before us is not one of invention or discovery, as it was for the primitive barbarians. It is one of adjustment.

The means for controlling our environment exist. The necessary facts are known or can be ascertained through research according to known methods. Goodwill and a desire for a better knowledge of the world's affairs are widespread among the populations of all the leading countries. Nor, in spite of the toll taken by the war, is there any lack of physicians qualified by their wisdom, experience, and intellectual integrity to care for the health of the body politic.

The materials for a better order exist. What remains is to make the right use of them—to adjust the available resources of goodwill, expert knowledge, and intellectual and moral leadership to the needs of the post-war world, and to set them to work together according to the rhythm of the age.

This, no more, but no less, is the problem of international intellectual co-operation.

§ 1

THE SEVEN STAGES OF PUBLIC EDUCATION

The first direction in which that co-operation is to be looked for is in the field of public education.

Public education is best defined as a process of harmonization between the inner and the outer. It is the

means by which the growing generation is assimilated into the life of the community.

Public education thus conceived does not cover the whole range of the duty owed by the older to the younger generation. It leaves on one side all those elements of the personality which are not immediately related to the social environment. There have been educational thinkers who have urged, not without force, that human beings would attain to a more harmonious expansion in communion with Nature, in the life of the fields and the woods, than by confinement within the walls of a class-room. Religion, too, has its powerful claims, which are sometimes vindicated but never entirely satisfied within the limits of a system of public education.

If, nevertheless, one civilized community after another has in recent generations established a system of compulsory education, the reason is that the instruction there provided, however much it may need to be supplemented by other more intimate influences, is indispensable to all who wish to enter into the life of their time. Reading and writing do not necessarily nourish the life of the soul: in the most intellectual community of which history bears record, that of ancient Greece, they occupied an entirely subordinate place; but, in the world as it is to-day, they have become and are universally now regarded as a necessary element of social discipline. The great material changes following on the Industrial Revolution have created a new type of society with new institutions. These institutions, whether political or economic, could not be carried on by a society of illiterates, whatever their degree of natural intelligence and refinement. Reading and writing, which were at one time, and still remain in backward corners of the world, a luxury, have become a necessity of civilization.

What reading and writing were for the nineteenth century a sense of the larger *res publica* is for the twentieth. Just as the ordinary citizen cannot face the problem of earning a livelihood without a modicum of schooling, so modern society as a whole cannot hope to face the problems upon which its own material survival depends, unless an international outlook becomes as prevalent among the general population as literacy is to-day.

How is this development to be brought about? No revolutionary change is required. All that is needed is to utilize, for purposes of international co-operation, the systems of public education which the various communities of the world have already provided, or are providing.

It cannot, indeed, be emphasized too strongly, at the outset of this discussion, that public education is a function which, by its very nature, must not, and indeed cannot, be brought under any form of international control. If there is one department of civilized life more than another in which uniformity is death and diversity the law of life, it is that through which the younger generation is initiated into the social heritage of its community or nation. There exist in the present-day world wide varieties of educational administration. In some States all schools are administered by the Central Government; in others, such as Switzerland, Germany, the United States, and Canada, the Central Government, being federal, has no authority over them; in others, as in Great Britain, though the Government is unitary, large powers are left to local education authorities. This brief catalogue, while it does not exhaust the existing varieties, is sufficient to show that an international control over systems of public education is not only theoretically undesirable but practically impossible without fundamental changes in the constitutional arrangements of numerous States. What is required,

let it be repeated, is not centralization or control, but simply the co-operation of the existing authorities, with their existing powers, for recognized common purposes.

Indeed, when the problem is closely examined, it becomes clear that, from the practical point of view, the task is not that of introducing a new subject into the curriculum, but simply that of helping institutions and teachers to carry out more consciously and effectively work upon which they are already engaged.

To what extent the task involved is one of stimulation and co-ordination rather than one of fresh construction will become clear from a brief analysis of the different stages of a full modern civic education.

There are seven distinct stages involved, all of them covered by existing institutions. Of these, five carry the student to the point at which, recurring to our medical analogy, he has acquired a sufficient knowledge of personal hygiene. Two others involve a professional training for those who intend to devote their lives to some form of political career.

I. The first stage is that which precedes any regular instruction. It is the stage at which the young child is cared for in the family or, if in a public institution, in a kindergarten or nursery school. It is the stage at which the human being becomes acquainted with his intimate environment, first with his own body, with his thumbs and toes, then with his family, with his home, his village or his town, and with his mother-tongue and the ancestral world opened up by it.

This is the most important stage in all education, and that in which the human mind makes the greatest advance. To pass from the womb and the cradle to the village, from the world of reverie and fancy to the world of social fact, from inarticulate crying to the expression of thoughts and

wishes in a traditional and perfected mode of human intercourse, is to have achieved an advance far greater than that which is required of the modern world from literacy to international understanding.

But this earliest stage is all-important in another respect also. It provides a sure and indispensable basis for all that follows by integrating the growing citizen with his community and nation. 'A man without a city', said Aristotle, 'is either a god or a beast'. No one can render true service in the cause of international co-operation if he has not first thoroughly absorbed in his own mind and soul the meaning and value of nationality. And this experience cannot be acquired by a mere effort of the intellect: it is not to be found in books, still less in newspapers. It must be lived. It supplies the permanent element, what has been called on an earlier page the static element, in political appreciation and judgement. Without it, no political opinion is of value. It may correctly calculate the play of the ripples on the surface of public life. It cannot begin to understand the great hidden movement of the deep.

Too often, indeed, has the advocate of international co-operation been identified with the *déraciné*. In reality the two are at opposite poles. The *déraciné* may sometimes render good service in other fields of human achievement. In the sphere of politics he is not only useless but mischievous, for he is constitutionally incapable of entering into that which is the deepest element in all political and social experience—the attachment of a people to its home, its traditions, and its institutions.

II. The second stage is that of so-called primary instruction. Here the child is brought for the first time into contact with professional teachers. The primary school is his initiation into the wider world, the world beyond his

familiar streets and fields, the world of great distances and endless varieties, filled with wonder and beauty and mystery.

No branch of the teaching profession has a more difficult and responsible task than that which labours, often with insufficient appreciation and reward, in the primary school. What do we ask for it in connexion with an understanding of the larger world ? Not systematic instruction, but something far more important—an attitude of mind.

For it is these impressionable and imitative years that fix the bent of the growing mind towards that which is foreign to its experience. Everyone, looking back to his own childhood, will recall the inner conflict which went on within his breast between curiosity and suspicion, between the natural impulse to welcome a new experience and the equally natural inclination, springing from indolence rather than from perversity, to reject it. That moment of doubt and of decision is the watershed between a closed and an open world. On the one side the waters run down through the windless valley of isolation and self-sufficiency to the stagnant pool of the Dead Sea. On the other, they make their way, taking in tributary after tributary, past smiling meadows and prosperous cities till they find themselves at one with the rhythm of the ocean that bathes the world.

Thus the primary school teacher holds in his or her hand the key to our problem. For it matters little *what* men think. What matters is *how* they think.

What can be done to render the primary school more equal to this immense responsibility ? There are two directions in which it seems natural to look for the improvements of which the teachers themselves are the first to feel the need.

The first is an amelioration of their professional position. This, no doubt, varies greatly in different countries ; but

in no country do primary teachers as a social group yet hold the rank or secure the preliminary education or the rewards to which the dignity and importance of their task entitle them. The teaching profession is a unity from the university to the primary school, and the community should see to it that this unity of function and of ideal finds its appropriate expression, both in social recognition and in the details of material organization.

The second much-needed improvement is the international interchange of primary teachers.

If the growing child is to be given a sense of the diversity of the world and to learn to overcome his distaste for what is strange and 'foreign', he must see the foreigner in the concrete and become accustomed to regard him as a human being like himself, although different in certain observable respects. And the foreigner who is to be this specimen of the wider world should not only be carefully selected, but should be able to share in the general interests of the community into which he is transported. The visiting foreign teacher exactly fulfils these conditions.

It should become a recognized practice among educational administrations that every primary school teacher should spend a year in a foreign country before he or she has reached the age of thirty, and, conversely, that every primary school, except those with a very small staff, should always have at least one visitor on its teaching body.

It will be asked how these visiting teachers will be able to give instruction. The answer is that they will have learned the language, and more than the language, of the country that they are visiting during their years of university education or other preparation. The first reform suggested above is an indispensable condition for the widespread adoption of the second.

It will perhaps also be asked why the interchange should be one of teachers rather than of children. Surely, it may be argued, a year abroad for the children, by interchange between schools, would be a more direct way of attacking the problem.

The answer to this suggestion has already been given, by implication, in the preceding argument. One of the main tasks of the primary school is to assimilate the younger generation to its environment. To subject this process to a violent interruption by a year abroad would be to sacrifice the greater for the less. Every one will realize after a moment's reflection that sudden changes of environment are not beneficial to young children, either physically, morally, or intellectually: at the primary school age indeed the three spheres cannot be precisely delimitated. Nobody considered that the children of primary school age who were refugees in the late war were to be congratulated, even if the schools in which they were placed were superior to those in their own countries. Moreover, the effect upon young children of premature international experience under unfavourable conditions can be studied, in more normal circumstances, in different parts of the world to-day. Constantinople is, or was until recently, a city where the children playing in the streets could chatter in two, three, or even four languages. The immigrant quarters of many cities in the United States provide an environment only a little less confusing; whilst recent investigators of educational conditions in Africa have drawn attention to the grave problems resulting from the premature contacts between the world of primitive Africa and the world of Western civilization. All these are abnormal conditions which the student of educational conditions will seek not to imitate but to avoid. The opening of the child's mind to the wider world must be gentle and gradual, coinciding

with the development of his own native powers of assimilation and observation.

III. Our next and third stage, that of secondary school education, is that of the development of personality. It marks the affirmation of self-consciousness in its various manifestations, physical, emotional, and intellectual. It carries the growing citizen across the crisis of adolescence and faces him, in the vast majority of cases in a practical form, with the problem of his personal relationship to the community.

What can the secondary school do for the development of international understanding?

Suggestions have been put forward that use should be made of this first fresh period of intellectual interest and self-consciousness to introduce some common world-wide material of education. If all young people learnt history out of the same manual, it is argued, or were taught the same standard elements of moral and civic instruction, they would grow up to be citizens of the world rather than of their own country.

This line of reasoning, although it has a certain plausibility, is fundamentally fallacious. It sins against the first principle of public education, which is the assimilation of the growing citizen into his own particular community. It sets up the old discredited ideal of uniformity as against the ideal of diversity. But even if it were desirable, which it is not, such a project is hopelessly unpractical. It proceeds on the assumption that the book is more important than the teacher. Every one who has had any classroom experience knows that the exact contrary is the case. The teacher is everything; the book is nothing – or, rather, the book is what the teacher likes to make of it. Education is a process of transmission from one living mind to another. The book is merely an instrument in that process. The

best teacher is he who, whether he uses the books of others or not, is all the while engaged in communicating his own unwritten book, his own living and expanding experience of his subject.

No doubt it is desirable that young people should be familiarized, either in the classroom or through the school library, with books giving a broad view of the development of human history. But no one such book can ever become a Bible on the subject; for it is beyond human capacity to reach the celestial objectivity which such a monopoly would imply. Mr. H. G. Wells, for instance, published some years ago an *Outline of History* which enjoyed a deservedly wide vogue in a great many countries. He has also published a volume of essays entitled *An Englishman Looks at the World*. He would probably be the first to admit that, in spite of all his efforts to free himself from narrowness or prejudice, the title of the latter book might very well be applied to the former.

Important, therefore, as is the choice of text-books and the development of school libraries, they do not touch the vital elements of our problem. These rest, in the secondary school as in the primary, with the teachers themselves.

If international exchanges are important at the primary stage they are equally important at the secondary. Every secondary teacher under thirty should spend a year abroad, and every secondary school without exception should have one or more foreign teachers on its staff.

Interchange at the secondary school stage will, indeed, from the strictly intellectual point of view, be more fruitful than at the primary: for there are certain secondary school subjects which have for their definite aim the promotion of international understanding. The chief of these are history, geography, and foreign languages.

It is not proposed to enlarge here upon the many direc-

tions in which current teaching methods in these subjects can be improved or the practice of backward countries and schools be brought up to those of the most advanced. This may well be left to the associations of professional teachers who in many individual countries, and now on an international scale also, are grappling with these problems. Suffice it to say that the cross-fertilization resulting from such discussions and contacts is destined to be a potent influence for the development of an international outlook in the coming generation. The immense improvement which has taken place in the study of geography throughout the Western world within the last generation may be cited as an example.

It will be more useful to dwell on certain other points which the devotees of particular subjects may be inclined to overlook.

Interchange of secondary teachers will perform a much needed service in drawing attention to an interesting and hitherto unduly disregarded question—that of the relation between subjects of school study and the life of the community.

The existing subjects of study and the values attached to them are largely traditional. Historians of education trace them back through the Enlightenment, the Jesuit schools, the Renaissance, and the monastic schools of the Middle Ages to classical antiquity. They have no doubt undergone many changes in the course of this *Odyssey*. Algebra we owe to the Arabs. Euclid has in recent years given place to geometry. Greek and Latin are less prominent, and the natural sciences have come more and more to the front. But these and similar changes, although related in a general way to movements of outside opinion, have not been based on any real analysis of the relation between the mind of the growing generation and its external environment.

Yet nothing strikes a teacher transported to a foreign classroom more immediately than the subtle difference between the values of his subject at home and abroad. It is not simply that the general 'standard' in his subject, as revealed in examination papers, is higher or lower than that to which he is accustomed. That is a crude and almost barbarous form of evaluation which the wandering scholar soon learns to discard. It is that he encounters a different degree of receptivity in the students and a different prestige and social estimation in the general community.

Sometimes this may be explained, in large degree at any rate, by historical causes. Thus the curious difference between the sense of history among Englishmen and among Irishmen, although both peoples have the historical sense in a marked degree, may grow less as particular causes which have been responsible for it lose their potency. The same reflection may be applied to similar phenomena in other parts of Europe. But there are other and more interesting cases in which the difference of values seems to spring from a more permanent social condition which the educator cannot ignore.

The clearest instance of this is the difference between the teaching value of school subjects in Europe and in the United States.

It is a common observation that American schools and colleges are strong in the natural sciences and weak in the arts. Shallow critics have concluded that American boys and girls are inferior in 'culture', whatever that may mean, to their European brothers and sisters. The true explanation is, of course, quite different. It is that American culture, springing, as all true culture must, out of the conditions of American life, is naturally directed rather to reflection on man's relation to external nature than to history, literature, or philosophy.

To the young American the element of Space is tenfold more real than the element of Time. Brought up in a home where wide distances and large economic opportunities are the staple of conversation, familiar with the telephone and the motor-car from his earliest childhood, accustomed to regard this or that activity of school and college in terms of business organization, looking forward to a career in which his eager and wide-ranging mind will find a spacious and congenial field of activity—what is history to him or he to history? His natural element of intellectual discipline is afforded by the sciences of space. He has been a geographer without knowing it from the day on which he first drove a car and an economist without knowing it from the day on which he first earned a dollar. If it is the function of education to help the mind to realize and interpret its experience, then geography and economics are more natural instruments of present-day American secondary education than history and literature.

This is but one illustration of the vistas opened out by an exchange of teachers at the secondary stage. How many of our present international difficulties are due to ignorance of these deep underlying differences between social values and attitudes of mind! And how many are due to the subtle relationships of superiority and inferiority that are too often set up as a result of them!

Not one ambassador but tens of thousands are needed to counteract these perpetual incentives to misunderstanding and irritation.

IV. But it is time to pass to the fourth stage, that of University education.

The university is the apex of the public educational system in a modern community. It is in a peculiar sense a national institution because it represents national intelligence and national traditions at their highest power and in

their most characteristic forms. But it is also in a peculiar sense international, for its very title 'Universitas' suggests that ideal of the unity and universality of knowledge which transcends all national distinctions and unites scholars in all communities and in every form of intellectual discipline in a common spirit of integrity and in a common search for truth.

The university has therefore, from the point of view of our inquiry, a twofold function. It is its duty at once to complete and perfect the process by which the growing citizen is assimilated into the life of his nation and to serve as a national centre of international intellectual co-operation.

These two functions, however theoretically distinct, are in practice closely interdependent. For a complete national education is the best and the most natural preparation for activity on the international plane and, conversely, continuous and familiar contact with the progress of knowledge and research in other countries is essential, both in the arts and the sciences, to the maintenance in any national institution of a true university level.

Thus, while the student is still, generally speaking, living and thinking on the national plane, the university teacher is forced by the demands of his subject and by the call of truth to cultivate a wider outlook. The special character and needs of the post-war era only serve to give an added stimulus to habits and tendencies inherent in the development of modern methods of scholarship and teaching. For our purposes, then, it will be convenient to discuss the student and the teacher separately.

What is meant by saying that the university completes the system of national education? What exact service does it, or should it, perform for the student?

It is difficult to frame an answer to such a question in a phrase: but perhaps the experience of those who owe

most, in this respect, to their university career may be summed up by saying that the university taught them to relate their intelligence to the world of real life. Every intellectual, by the mere exercise of continuous reflection, is perpetually retiring, as it were, into a hermitage and isolating himself from the life of the world around him. Creation implies solitude. The service rendered by the university is at once to stimulate thought and to supply its natural corrective—to bridge the gulf between theory and experience, between books and life, between ideology and reality. The student who passes from the turmoil and confusion of the modern world into the calm of the university is asking for some theory or interpretation of the chaos around him. If he is perplexed by the business world, he seeks it in political economy; if politics excite his curiosity, he seeks it in political science or history; if he is haunted by deeper problems he seeks it in philosophy. But the traditional solutions offered by these and similar academic disciplines offer him only a provisional relief. Experience will break in and resume the argument. Life will prove larger and more complex than the formula; and the true university teacher, as near to life itself as to the masters of thought in his subject, perpetually recalls the student from the one realm to the other. Thus a university discipline may be described as a dialogue of the mind between ideas and realities.

Into this dialogue politics, in the narrower sense of the word, do not enter. Conditions indeed may, and do, occur under which university students are drawn into affairs and problems of State. But they are, and should remain, abnormal. Neither the student nor the State benefit, in the long run, by such premature 'politicization'. Intellectual integrity is a more precious gift to bring to the State than any practical service that can be rendered at this stage.

The university teacher, on the other hand, has a more direct and pressing responsibility to the cause of international understanding. Whether the emphasis of his work lies in direct teaching or in research, his position marks him out as an international figure. If the secondary school needs to provide the world with diplomats, the mission of the university is to provide plenipotentiaries of the highest rank. For since, as we have already seen, the difficulties which endanger the peace of the world are predominantly intellectual, it is primarily to the universities rather than to the chancelleries that we must look for their redress.

The methods by which international intellectual co-operation can be promoted in subjects not directly related to public affairs are best reserved for a later section. It is with the studies bearing on the present-day world that we are now concerned.

Nomenclature varies from country to country, but these studies may be broadly enumerated as history, geography, law, economics, sociology, and political science. Anthropology may be ranked as a branch of sociology as international law is a branch of law.

Every one of these studies requires in a teacher, not simply acquaintance with the work of foreign scholars, but an international outlook and international experience.

A distinction may, however, be drawn between them. Whilst history, geography, law (excluding international law), and economics can be effectively taught by teachers, international indeed in their outlook but anchored in their own university, sociology, political science, and international law are, in the present-day world, from their very nature, what may be described as peripatetic studies. The historian and the geographer, the lawyer and the economist do indeed constantly require the stimulus and refreshment of travel.

But change of *residence* is not indispensable to them for keeping abreast of their subjects. Not so the political scientist, the sociologist, and the international lawyer. Their field of study is the actual present-day world, in the fullness of its life and movement; and to cut them off and to keep them imprisoned in a single centre is as cruel as to deprive a chemist of his laboratory. In these studies, to be stationary is to be 'behind the times'. And a sociologist, a political scientist, or an international lawyer who is behind the times not only ceases to be helpful to his students but becomes a positive hindrance to them and to his fellow-workers. Not a few of our present-day difficulties can be traced to the fact that the 'intellectuals' from whom help was, or would have been, sought are still living in the world of 1914. But for us of to-day the sociology, the political science, and the international law of 1914 are antediluvian.

This is not written in any spirit of criticism of a profession which has suffered as much as any other through the events of the war. The criticism is addressed rather to those who have not hitherto recognized the necessity of enabling the men singled out to be public physicians to enjoy the clinical experience indispensable to the exercise of their craft.

The practice of the sabbatical year, one year abroad out of seven, has become a recognized custom for university teachers in the United States. It should become an equally recognized practice that every teacher of political science, sociology, and international law should spend at least one term in every year in a foreign country. Conversely, every university faculty in which these subjects are included should number one or more visiting teachers.

We have now brought the student to the close, or at any rate to the last period, of his normal university career.

But we have not so far provided him with any direct instruction in international relations or with any direct experience of the world outside the frontiers of his native land. He has indeed been, from his earliest years, in contact with visitors from other countries who have opened his mind, broadened his interests and stifled nascent prejudices and inhibitions. But neither at school nor university have they given him, except incidentally, systematic instruction in the political problems of the larger *res publica*. International relations in the technical sense have not occupied his attention as part of his academic course.

The reason for this procedure has already been indicated. Political understanding, like political institutions, is surest and healthiest when it has developed by gradual stages from the lesser sphere to the greater. It is he who has proved his faithfulness, and his power of judgement, in small things who is fitted to employ them on the greater. To expect university undergraduates who cannot give a coherent account of the history and institutions of their own country to form an opinion of any value on the problems of the League of Nations is to sin against the first principle of international co-operation. That principle may be formulated in the axiom that *personality precedes co-operation*. An individual, a social group, a country, must have something to contribute, must in fact *be* something or somebody, before it is fit to be accepted in a larger society formed for ideal ends. Thus stated, the principle seems so elementary as hardly to be worth emphasizing. Nevertheless, it is frequently ignored by so-called internationalists; and the theoretical futility or practical failure of a large number of international projects can be set down to its non-observance.

The growing citizen has, however, now reached the stage

at which he must grapple with the larger problems of society. What equipment does he bring to them?

He has enjoyed a good modern education. That is to say, he has a grasp of the studies which are at the base of modern society—of history, geography and economics, mathematics, physics, and biology, with enough insight into such studies as philosophy, law, psychology, and physiology to realize their place in the scheme of human knowledge. In addition he will be familiar with the literature, as well as the history and institutions, of his own country and with those of at least one other country, whether ancient or modern. He will also be able, as a natural consequence, to read and write and speak in a second language. If his special studies have been in the field of antiquity, he should nevertheless be familiar with a modern language, a requirement which is not likely to cause him difficulty.

This catalogue of subjects is not intended to suggest that he will have stored his memory with a complete collection of the facts within the range of these large disciplines. His teacher's object has been to make him an educated man, not an encyclopaedia. All that is meant is that his intelligence and judgement have been trained on them and that he has assimilated their peculiar contribution. 'Education', as a great Oxford teacher was never tired of saying, 'is what remains behind when you have forgotten all that you have learned'.

With such an education behind him a man is ready to face the problems of the larger *res publica*. He will bring to them qualities of moral judgement, intellectual integrity, patience, and diligence that are the raw material of statesmanship. He will bring the power to discern truth from falsehood and the essential from the trivial. He will bring the capacity, which history and literature

have helped to form, to identify himself with other groups and nations, to think, if need be, with their thoughts and to feel with their feelings: so that his personality helps rather than hinders the rhythm of their being. And he will bring also two humbler accomplishments, too often ignored in these modern days, knowledge of how to read and how to travel.

For reading, once the privilege of the few, seems almost in danger of becoming one of the lost arts. Men read grossly and inordinately, bringing to the printed page the same kind of indiscriminate appetite that the glutton or the drunkard brings to the pleasures of the table. Ask them to describe or analyse what they have read and they will too often be unable to do so. For their object in reading is not to understand what is in the book but to escape from themselves. Reading has, in fact, in our nerve-racked and industrialized society, become for millions little more than a narcotic.

For such a demand it was necessary to provide a supply, and it has not been wanting. Its most characteristic product is the novel of the railway bookstall and the circulating library; but, in varying degrees in different countries, the newspaper also ministers to this craving for sensation.

The student who enters upon the study of public affairs will have learnt at the university to exercise his mind upon printed matter. He will know that the function of a book is to stimulate his intelligence, not to befuddle it, to serve as an instrument for his own thinking rather than as its lifeless substitute. He will have discovered how to proportion his reading to the needs and questionings of his mind. He will know how, when, what, and how much, to read, his mind having acquired the same nicety in its assimilative powers as his body for its physical diet. He

will, therefore, be well prepared to face the problem, essential for the understanding of international relations, of how to read newspapers.

The newspaper Press is often criticized as an influence for evil in international relations. The criticism is unfair. For the evils complained of are not of the newspapers' own creation. They are a response to a public demand. So long as the mass of the reading public remains as ignorant of foreign countries and peoples as it is at present, international relations will inevitably remain one of the most convenient channels for ministering to the craving for what is abnormal and sensational.

It may indeed be said in defence of the newspaper that it is intrinsically truer to life than the book. A book is the individual production of a single writer, who may be more or less representative of his community. A newspaper is a collective production in which a great number of minds have collaborated. Every column and line of it conveys a social truth. Every word, even the most inaccurate, rings genuine. The political news, the social items, the advertisements, the leading articles, are all charged with significance. If they do not always bear exactly the meaning that appears on the surface, nevertheless the meaning is there. They were written and inserted with a purpose: and that purpose an educated man can divine. For the tired worker, returning home in the car from his work, the newspaper may bring bewilderment or even falsehood. To the trained social and historical inquirer it is a mine of information. He will read the metropolitan journal, the local news-sheet, and the professional or sporting organ with equal interest. He will note what is said, what is implied, and, in international relations often the most important of all, what is passed over in silence. He will remark the details of

make-up which vary so much from country to country and throw so much light on intellectual tendencies.

It is sometimes said that international politics cannot be understood from the newspapers. So far as what are called the secrets of the chancelleries are concerned this may be true—even if only to a limited extent. But these secrets are nowadays seldom of the first importance and, moreover, they have a tendency to cancel one another out. In reality an educated man who knows where to look can perfectly well keep abreast of the movement of international affairs. He must of course read newspapers representing various opinions and countries, correcting one bias by another and remembering that the further an account has to travel before it reaches its destination the more outspoken it can often afford to be. Any one who has practised this habit over a course of years will be less disposed to criticize the newspapers than to be astonished at the ignorance of the public which, with so much instructive material laid before it, has assimilated so little. How many, for instance, of the readers whose eyes wander over the column sent daily from Paris to the London newspapers have any real knowledge of the working of the French constitution or any real sense of the movement of French public life? What is needed indeed is not more information, or even better information, so much as better capacities for apprehending it. The present relationship, in many countries, between the judgement of the public and the mass of information supplied to it recalls that between the bread and the wine in Falstaff's dinner.

There is only one sovereign remedy for international misunderstanding and that is travel. But travel is another of the arts which are losing their character through vulgarization. In the days when travellers were few the citizen who journeyed abroad regarded himself some-

what in the light of an unofficial ambassador. He entered into real relations with the countries that he visited and he was at pains to give in his turn the best of what his own country had to contribute. The contacts were few and unduly aristocratic; but they were genuine and constructive. In the eighteenth century, as in the earlier age of humanism, international intellectual co-operation, however limited in its range, was an effective reality.

To-day, we are accustomed to mass migrations of human beings across national frontiers. Sometimes these migrations, as in the case of most of those who cross from the Old World to the New, involve a permanent change of domicile. Sometimes they are merely seasonal, as in the case of the rapidly increasing counter-movement from the New World to the Old. But in either case the herd instinct tends to predominate. Yielding to the natural human dislike for change, the traveller surrounds himself with every known self-protective device against the impact of his new environment. Much has been done in recent years, especially in the United States, to promote the assimilation of the immigrant into his new community, and the grave social problem involved in his maladjustment has been generally recognized. The equally grave international problem created by the maladjustment of the tourist to the countries through which he is transported has been unduly neglected. Yet the disorders set up, social and moral, no less than economic, by the presence of these migrants, conveyed around, ignorant of the language, laws, and customs, of the country, under conditions which insulate them from their environment in a kind of peripatetic hermitage, are becoming too serious to be ignored. 'Travellers' tales', which used to be instructive treatises or agreeable romances, are now too often synonymous with ill-natured gossip based on an experience

with a hotel bill or a dispute over a window in a carriage. One of the grossest fallacies current in the nineteenth century was that international understanding would be promoted automatically by the multiplication of individual contacts. Great journeys and little minds go ill together.

V. The fifth and final stage of the ordinary citizen's education will consist in a first-hand experience of foreign countries acquired under conditions which promote true international understanding. For this purpose a particular mode of educational experience and discipline needs to become developed and accepted. This may be described as the School of International Contacts.

A school of international contacts is an institution at which university students in the later stages of their academic course are brought together from many countries to meet one another and a distinguished and equally international group of university teachers. Such a school, which is naturally organized during the summer months, lasts for a period of not less than two and not more than ten weeks. Its average duration is thus, for reasons which will be explained, shorter than that of a normal university term. Its numbers at any one time should not exceed about 100. The education provided consists of short courses of lectures, seldom less than two or more than six by a single teacher, followed by a discussion in which questions are put and views advanced by individual students. At the close of each short course a whole period is devoted to its discussion. The programme is bilingual throughout, interpretation being seldom needed except when a student of a third nationality finds it convenient to use his own language to render his thought more clear.

In addition to the lecturers, who are chosen not merely for their knowledge of a particular subject but also for the width of their sympathies and their skill in eliciting and

handling a discussion, there is also attached to the school a small staff of younger graduates. Their special task is to maintain the general intellectual level of the school and to meet the special needs of individual students or groups of students. They are themselves, of course, drawn from various nationalities.

The subjects covered by the lectures are drawn from the social and political life of the present-day world. There are courses dealing with the culture and institutions of individual countries, others dealing with general problems of international law, international economic relations or international politics, others again convey the personal experience of some recognized authority on international questions with which he has himself been concerned. It will be of great advantage to the life of such a school, if it is so situated, as, for example, at Geneva, that it can draw upon the services of a large body of persons who have had experience of international affairs in different fields of activity.

The material of discussion will thus, within the course of a few weeks, present a great variety of aspects and interests. Theory and practice, law and sociology, economics and political science, sometimes even aesthetics and, above all, the best of nationality together with the best of internationalism, all find their place in turn. The students reside in the town, as in an ordinary European university, and there are no special rules of discipline. But means are taken to provide facilities for social contacts and recreation.

Experience has shown that a school of this character performs a service for which no other systematic provision has as yet been made. Its special characteristics can be briefly analysed.

In a famous passage of the *Apology*, Socrates describes himself as the gadfly of the Athenian state, 'a great and

noble steed who is tardy in his motions owing to his very size and requires to be stirred into life'. The student at a school of international contacts, tardy in his motions owing to the very size of the modern world, is submitted to something analogous to the old Socratic discipline. He lives in an atmosphere of constant stimulus and self-restraint. He is perpetually being startled by the outburst of new opinions, new theories, new philosophies, emanating from the representatives of countries, groups, and even races which have been for him hitherto mere names on a map. Fighting with all the tenacity of a young intellectual to maintain his own hard-won footing, he is surprised, sometimes almost battered, into a realization that the world is too diverse to be summed up in a formula. Arriving confident in his own opinions and eager to be their missionary, he returns with the discovery that the opinions of others, however unreasonable, are, for a student of the world, even more interesting than his own.

This discovery is no mere intellectual achievement. It registers what is predominantly a moral experience, an enlargement and deepening of the personality. It might almost be compared to a conversion. To have become familiar with systems of international arbitration or with the working of the Swiss constitution is no doubt a valuable discipline. But the facts will pass from the memory and will need to be refreshed on a future occasion. To have learnt to open the mind to hitherto unknown and even inconceivable states of thought and feeling is to have undergone a permanent change. It is like learning to swim. Once a swimmer always a swimmer.

Moreover, as a result of this experience, every particular problem henceforward is seen in a new light. The mind will rise instinctively above the dust of petty controversy to a higher altitude, where the scene can be observed in its

larger setting and the opposing party and its stronghold also brought into view. Everything is seen in its wider relations.

Thus the object of a school of international contacts is not to provide systematic instruction in any branch of study. It leaves international law, political science, and political economy, to the ordinary academic faculty or to the professional institution. Its students earn no 'credits', pass no examinations, receive no diplomas. But, if they have been loyal to the discipline, they carry away a special hall-mark. They have become, in the true sense of a much-abused phrase, men of the world.

It will by now have become apparent why such a school is organized over only a comparatively short period. It is too intense, and the strain on the student is too great, to be prolonged. The task of opening the mind to the appreciation of international problems is one of the most fatiguing that can be conceived. Carried on in a society which is not simply bilingual but multi-national, it involves, almost at every moment, a fresh adjustment. The meals, the excursions, the recreations, are sometimes as intense as the lectures and discussions themselves; and the latter do not always end for the night when the evening meeting is dispersed. Experience has shown that students are themselves the best judges of the length of their course, which must vary according to individual taste, temperament, and adaptability.

This suggests some observations on a matter which the reader must have been surprised not to have found treated on an earlier page—the international exchange of university students.

Scholarship systems for students to pursue university studies in foreign countries have been in force for a number of years, in some cases, as in that of the Rhodes

Scholarships, for a generation. A mass of evidence therefore exists on their results and conditions and on the conclusions drawn from them by those who administer them. The complete assembling of this material and its appreciation by a competent international Commission is urgently to be desired. In the meantime it would seem to be clearly established that the administrators of such funds have tended to push back the age of travel from the undergraduate to the post-graduate years and have found it more satisfactory to send students for regular courses abroad when they have a distinct professional object or task of research in view. There has, however, been a recent initiative which will be watched with interest, to send to Europe American students in the third or 'junior' year of their undergraduate course.

A related question on which inquiry is also needed is the social life of the foreign student, whether living alone or in hostels specially provided to meet his needs. It will not be surprising if it is found that the task of adaptation to a foreign environment becomes so fatiguing in the long run that foreign students, like the less intellectual immigrant, tend to flock together and even to intensify their national sentiments, reacting against their environment rather than drawing from it the benefit that they came to acquire. It is such difficulties as these that are avoided in the short-period school of international contacts.

We have now brought the student to the close of his formal training for the study of the larger *res publica*. Other less formal means which may, and do, contribute usefully to the same end fall outside the field of public education proper and must be reserved for a later section. But it must be clearly noted already at this point that as education advances from stage to stage, its organization must necessarily increase in elasticity. In the university

and still more in the school of contacts, an atmosphere of freedom and of intellectual initiative is all-important. There is no department of human activity where the heavy administrative methods of modern large-scale commercial enterprise are less at home or defeat their purpose more completely. What may be efficiency in the one region becomes an encumbrance in the other. The spirit of higher education is subtle and elusive ; it bloweth where it listeth ; it cannot be manufactured, although it can quickly be extinguished, by buildings, equipment, and officialdom. Where two or three are gathered together in the search for truth, there is a university, richer far, sometimes, than the cold halls in which students are numbered and tabulated to receive the wholesale diploma resulting from an anonymous examination. Not so did the greatest of teachers ply their craft, either in Greece, Palestine, or India. Not so will wisdom and culture be cajoled back to our own lifeless and mechanized age. Thus we may expect to find experiments in higher education worked out in many new and hitherto unrecognized forms and often associated with voluntary enterprise, on a national or international basis. The administrative relationship between such efforts and public systems of education is a problem that still remains to be worked out. A parallel in the national field exists in the relationship established in some countries between the public authorities and enterprises in adult education.

VI. We pass now to a new and more exclusive stage, that of professional training for what can be termed an international career.

The opening of the mind to international understanding is indeed not a special luxury for the few. It is an indispensable concomitant of democracy. It goes with the vote. 'We must educate our masters', said an English statesman at a moment when the suffrage had been widely extended

but no system of general popular education yet brought into being. We are in a similar perilous interlude to-day. We have established an international political organization without providing the people with the means for understanding or controlling it.

Nevertheless, wide as are the ramifications of international affairs, there is a certain field which can be clearly delimited, in which they are chiefly concentrated ; and work in this field constitutes international activity in this technical sense of the term. Such a career has existed for generations in the diplomatic and consular services. Its range has been greatly extended by the political, economic, and social developments of recent years. There is indeed something like an international society, members of which, bound together by the ties of a common professional experience, are dispersed throughout the leading centres of the world. Side by side with the Foreign Office officials, diplomats, and consuls, there are the officials of public international organizations, of which the League of Nations is the chief but by no means the only example : there are the officials of voluntary international organizations ; there are the writers, editorial or otherwise, who specialize in international subjects ; there are men in a great number of posts in the business world, amongst which the intelligence services attached to important houses are worthy of special mention ; there are men in professional positions, as in medicine, law, and engineering, who need to maintain close contact with international affairs from their particular standpoint ; there are administrators in public departments, other than the ministries of foreign affairs, who are more and more being drawn into the work of international co-operation, whether their special function be health, transit, justice, commerce, or even defence : finally there are the members of the legislative branch of the governments, deputies,

ex-deputies, and would-be deputies, for whom, since they are the exponents of public affairs to the voters, a close and thorough knowledge of the subject is specially important.

This large field of work calls for new and very special educational facilities: for the future of international relations, and therefore of civilization itself, depends in a peculiar degree on the internationalists. If they are equal to their task, there is hope that the peoples behind them may second their efforts. But if those in the van fail or flinch, if the chosen bodyguard of peace is disloyal to its trust, where are we to look for help? *Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?*

Yet how little stands at present between us and such a disaster those who best know the conditions would be the first to admit. The international career does, indeed, number in its ranks an *élite* of men who are not only heroes but saints. The world knows little of them: for their work is done behind the scenes, and fame for them is not a reward for their own labours, but an inducement to lead others into the path of wisdom. Self-effacement has indeed become the law of their being: in the existing frailty of human nature it is for them the first condition of success. Alive to every motion in that sensitive and rarefied atmosphere, the recipients of every confidence, the repair-gang after every breakdown, councillors of the old, inspirers of the young, with the right word, in one of five languages, ever ready on their lips and an unforgettable smile of welcome even in the most over-driven hour, never depressed, never angry, never unjust, never impatient, of such is the apostolate of internationalism.

But to have encountered such rare spirits and to have watched them at work, facing disappointment after disappointment, is to realize the immensity and—one might

almost add—the tragic irony of their Sisyphean task. For in truth there is no region in which true internationalism is more difficult than that in which it is ostensibly practised. The very multiplication of contacts tends of itself, when not counteracted by habituation or deliberate effort, to set up processes of reaction and irritation of which every thoughtful participant in an international gathering soon becomes aware. Thus it is that, in such meetings, where professions of good will and fraternity are on every lip, the atmosphere of the proceedings can fall far below that of a similar gathering on a purely national basis. Internationalism, like war or danger or other abnormal experiences, can call out both the best and the worst in human nature. It is not true that it makes good men better and bad men worse: that is too crude a criterion. There are men of far from flawless disposition who can render excellent service in the international field, while others, whose desires and intentions are undoubtedly closer to the ideal, find themselves the prey to influences to which, in normal circumstances, they could have offered easy resistance. The fact is that when a human being is placed in a thoroughly uncongenial environment, he is unable to bring his real personality into play and is for all practical purposes a sick man. International work is carried on to-day, far more than the outside world realizes, by men who are not only intellectually but physically unequal to their task. The first maxim of the international worker should be: 'Physician, look to your own health.'

This is one, and perhaps the chief, reason for the failure of so many of the experiments in direct international administration. Men placed in positions where they were expected to rise above the normal level of conduct and understanding insensibly descended beneath it. This, too, explains the glaring discrepancy between the preaching and

the practice of internationalism. It is easy to profess the international faith at the circumference, in the comfortable seclusion of a monoglot environment. To remain true to it at the centre, against all the natural emotions of the inner man, requires a constant effort of self-mastery as well as habituation to a perpetual process of intellectual adjustment.

For it is when the problem has been brought down from the clouds of sentiment to the plane of practical action, when the men seated round the Committee table are in actual intellectual communication, that the greatest difficulties begin. It is then that national characteristics become most manifest and the clash between them most pronounced. It is easy to recognize in a general way that Shakespeare differs from Dante, and that Molière and Goethe differ from Walt Whitman. It is quite another matter to face the practical problem resulting from the fact that the nations of which those great writers embody the quintessence have each their own characteristic way of applying their minds to a given task. The troubles of an international conference begin, not with item one on the agenda-paper, but over the drawing-up of the agenda-paper itself.

Students of national characteristics will indeed find fascinating and abundant material for study in the international field. The differences in the international theorizing of the various nations have often been remarked on: the American, British, French, German, Italian, and Scandinavian projects for a League of Nations, and the ideas and traditions they respectively embody, are one of the most interesting illustrations of this. Indeed, one of the reasons why schools of contacts and similar activities are urgently needed is to prevent internationalism from splitting up into groups of rival sectaries organized on national lines. We

have at various times in recent years been not far from such a development.

But the working out of these different attitudes in forms of practical organization is even more instructive. Three distinct national types of international organization may already be distinguished. There is the British, transplanted from Whitehall, as Whitehall itself can be traced back to Oxford and Cambridge. There is the French, bearing the strong impress of the French administrative system and the French intellectual tradition. There is the American, in which the influence of the methods of large-scale business predominates. To carry the analysis further would be invidious. Each system has its virtues and defects: each may be more or less appropriate to the particular matter in hand. But what must not be forgotten, in our contemplation of systems, is that each of them will, in the field with which we are concerned, be administered by a body of men drawn, not only from the nation whose modes of thought and action it tends to embody, but from many others as well.

It will thus be readily understood why it is of prime importance that the professional training for international work should not be carried on in a purely national atmosphere. For perhaps the most important element in that preparation consists in the perfection of the mechanism of intellectual adjustment. International co-operation can only be carried on by men and women who have learned how to co-operate. Co-operation is first a discovery and then a habit. The school of contacts promotes the discovery. The professional school forms and fortifies the habit.

This is not the place in which to enumerate, still less to appraise, the efforts which have been set on foot to organize instruction for international careers. They exhibit great variations in the terms and average age of admission; in the character of the instruction; in the length and other

conditions of the course and, still more, in the spirit that pervades the institution. Different professional, social, political, and even philosophic influences may be detected in them. But they have this much in common—that they recognize that there is a more or less clearly distinguishable body of knowledge which is indispensable to those entering upon international work and that that international work, despite its wide varieties, has a certain common professional character. Moreover, these institutions are international, not only in their subject of study but also in their *clientèle*. They all, in varying degrees, show a considerable registration of foreign students. It would undoubtedly be a great advantage, not only for these visiting students but for the institutions themselves and for the wider world, if some system of co-ordination could be worked out by which students could pass freely from one institution to another. Proposals to this effect have already been put forward by one or more of them and, although there are obvious practical difficulties to be overcome, the establishment of a working arrangement of this kind is so clearly desirable that it would seem to be only a question of time. When this has been achieved, the world will have, not indeed an international university, which, as we have seen, is a conception that involves a certain confusion of thought, but an organism, dispersed in different institutions throughout the world, serving the needs of an international profession and manifesting at once its high professional standard and its strictly international character.

The field of training thus opened out provides for the needs of those whose lives are to be spent in the practical tasks of internationalism. To recur to the medical analogy, it is intended for the practitioners. But there is still an important region which we have left unexplored. It is what may be called the domain of preventive medicine—

the promotion of scientific research into the causes of the disorders to which the body politic is exposed.

VII. Preventive medicine, as applied to politics, is an unfamiliar conception. The world of science and the world of government have in recent generations moved in separate orbits and their paths have seldom crossed. There would seem to be an historical explanation for this. The development of scientific methods of inquiry has coincided, in the West at any rate, with the development of democratic methods of government. Democracy, in its early phases, has a natural prejudice against organized knowledge. It likes to regard all men as equally able to govern, equally fitted, that is, to occupy any position in public life. One of the most interesting fields of study in the history of the United States is to watch how this primitive egalitarian philosophy of popular government has been slowly giving place to more scientific conceptions. In Europe the controversy has been fought out on a rather different plane: it has been not so much a struggle between general adaptability and particular capacities, as between aristocratic privilege and a career open to talent. But in both domains, in the Old World as in the New, those who stood for the application of scientific methods and conceptions to the art of government have had a hard and discouraging battle to sustain against the forces of reaction and inertia.

But the needs of the post-war world are such that popular government is doomed unless it calls to its aid those who hold the keys to the solution of its problems. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, before democracy had become the vogue, it was not unusual for a prince to ask advice of a scholar. Hobbes and Locke, Montesquieu and Voltaire, Leibnitz and Spinoza, all had their admirers in high places. But such patronage was a luxury. To-day, in the bewildering mass of our problems, the association

between scientific inquiry and the art of government has become a prime necessity. Knowledge is power. Authority without knowledge is powerless. Power dissociated from authority is a revolutionary force. Unless the modern world works out a satisfactory relationship between expert knowledge and popular control the days of democracy are numbered. Power will be divided between the arts of thought and the arts of action, the thinkers, whether they be lawyers or economists, chemists or geologists, botanists or engineers, biologists or anthropologists, becoming the partners or servants of those who have mastered the technique of modern large-scale organization.

Into this, the prime problem of post-war democracy, we cannot enter further here, for our subject is not government but education. Nevertheless, it was necessary to mention it in order to emphasize how vitally important is the place occupied in the public life of a modern community by those whose lives are dedicated to the advancement of knowledge.

VIII. This brings us to the last or eighth stage of our inquiry, the organization of research into the problems of the larger *res publica*.

How can the community best utilize the services of its scientific inquirers?

The problem thus presented is, from the administrative point of view, no easy one. All that has been said in the preceding discussion about the need for elasticity in methods of organization and of a sense of independence for the intellectual worker applies here with tenfold force. Research can be aided, stimulated, encouraged: it cannot, in the strict sense of the word, be organized. The letter killeth, the spirit maketh alive.

Moreover, the field covered by the studies bearing on the problems of the body politic is so large and various

that it defies exact definition and delimitation. We are long past the days when the studies bearing on public affairs could be distinguished by an adjectival label—‘political’ science, ‘political’ economy, ‘international’ law. There is, indeed, hardly a subject represented in a university faculty whose exponents might not, at some moment, be called upon by statesmen for their advice. One of the most interesting features of the development of the League of Nations has been the way in which one department of knowledge after another has been drawn upon for service in the field of practical international work. The collaboration of specialists from different countries in the discussion of remedies for public maladies is a thing to which the public has now become quite accustomed. The converse to this must not be overlooked: such international collaboration, whether on regular committees or for emergency inquiries, is of great benefit to the specialists themselves, not only by keeping their knowledge in touch with reality but also by maintaining the sense of their membership in an international fraternity.

It is likely, therefore, that the development of studies bearing on the problems of the *res publica* will be greatly facilitated in coming years by the constant calls made upon men with first-hand knowledge to sit on committees and other public bodies. Such men will, in many cases, be occupying ordinary chairs in some subject at university institutions.

Nevertheless, it is obvious that there is room, in addition, for what may be termed special institutes of preventive medicine—that is to say, institutions continuously engaged in studying the causes of disorders in the body politic.

Examples of such institutes exist, and others are projected, in various countries, in the near future.

It is clearly preferable that they should be established

in numerous centres, in touch with national institutions and sources of knowledge rather than at one professedly international centre. No one body of men, however devoted, is fit to be picked out, or likely to be generally accepted, as international *par excellence*; and the same must be said of any particular centre. Every continent, every race, every people, has its distinctive contribution to make to problems which, however technical and non-national they may seem to be on the surface, nevertheless almost invariably contain some element which brings individual or national idiosyncrasy into play.

Moreover, if one of the tasks of such inquirers is to bring their ideas and conclusions to bear upon public opinion, they are far more likely to exercise the influence which is their due if it cannot be said against them that they have lost contact with their fellow-countrymen during the progress of their inquiry. The true scholar, who has served his apprenticeship to internationalism, is as good a servant of Truth at home as abroad; but, in the existing state of opinion, he will be trusted more readily, and his countrymen will be more proud of him, if he has done his work in a national institution.

There are therefore sound reasons, both of a theoretical and practical order, for preferring a system of collaboration between individual institutes of international research in various countries to the plan of constituting a single central institute, whether or not connected with the League of Nations.

The task of international intellectual co-operation is, as has already been said, not one of centralization, but of stimulus and synthesis.

These separate national institutes should, however, be in the closest possible contact, both official and unofficial, through their individual workers.

It might prove possible, for example, to arrange for simultaneous inquiries into particular problems. There are controversies in the international field which are eminently suited for this method of treatment. The whole agglomeration of difficulties, roughly and perhaps wrongly described by the Western World as the race problem, might present a very different aspect if it formed the subject of reports issued simultaneously from London, Paris, Berlin, Rome, Baltimore, Honolulu, Calcutta, and Tokio.

Indeed, the main reason why it is desirable that special institutes of international research should be established is not because they would cover the ground—the field is far too various for that—but because they would provide an object-lesson in the spirit and method in which international problems should be approached. Just as a skilful doctor knows how to allay an inflammation, so skilled inquirers into public disorders will know how to de-emotionalize the material of their study. Every political problem, however passionately men may feel about it this way or that, has its non-contentious elements. The wise physician, working from the normal to the abnormal, from the sound to the infected area, will not only suggest or provide positive treatment for the problem itself, but will know how to raise the whole tone of public discussion on the general issue. Experience has shown, more than once in these recent years, how quickly the public mind will respond to this procedure. For, in polities as in other departments of life, fever is abnormal and unnatural: high passions wear themselves out by their very violence. Man is a reasonable being, when his reason has access to the knowledge which is its natural food.

When the reason and judgement of man have once more been brought into a harmonious relationship with his environment, they will resume their ascendancy in the

rhythm of an altered world. To facilitate this adjustment and to make the post-war generation conscious of this rhythm is the primary task of international intellectual co-operation.

§ 2

KNOWLEDGE AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS

We pass now from the problem of education in the post-war world to a larger and more difficult question—the place to be given in that world to knowledge and to those who hold its keys.

The relationship between the philosopher and the statesman is the oldest problem of civilization. Knowledge and power, thought and action, intellectual insight and practical mastery, have confronted one another in all ages. Each is indispensable to the other in the scheme of human life; yet each, in its self-sufficiency and in the natural reluctance of opposite natures to collaborate, would make as little use of the other as possible. Diogenes telling Alexander not to interrupt his contemplations and Napoleon with his irritable fulminations against the *idéologues* are types of the two contrasted attitudes which go to make up the unity of civilization.

The Greeks were the first to see that this conflict of temperaments must be systematically adjusted in the larger interests of society. Having discovered the inner relationship between Knowledge and Power, they set themselves to work out, in one region after another, the means by which intellectual leadership might be placed at the service of the community. It is this which constitutes their claim to be the originators of Western civilization, and, possibly, in the strict sense of the term, of all civilization whatsoever. The search for truth and the thirst for beauty, the ardour of adventure and the energy of com-

mand, every excellence of thought and sensibility and practical achievement, all these alike they *civilized*—drew into the service, that is, of a many-sided but harmonious and orderly civic life. The Assembly, the Law Court, the Market Place, the Theatre, and the Temple, marked the civic consecration, the *civilization*, of Force and Government, of Custom and Jurisprudence, of Discussion and Philosophy, of Festivals and the Drama, of Architecture and Engineering, Sculpture and Painting, and, in a sense to which every parish church still bears witness, of Religion itself. Athens had no place for the two extremes of solitude, the hermit philosopher and the hermit dictator. The man who stood aloof from civic life and withheld his contribution from the community and its criticism, whether out of arrogance or out of modesty, was characterized by a term (*idiotes*) which, through a natural modification of meaning, is now applied to those whom a failure of the mental powers forbids to take part in the normal life of mankind.

The high tide of Greek civilization lasted but a few generations. Assailed by forces from the 'barbarian' world which it could neither withstand nor convert to its own standards, the City-State surrendered its spiritual supremacy and became a provincial municipality. The men of action were called to larger horizons and more imperial tasks, whilst the men of thought abandoned all hope of controlling the movement of events by the power of ideas and relapsed, with their groups of chosen students, into a sequestered academic existence of their own. Thus the seamless garment of civilization woven by the Greeks was torn asunder and there began anew that divorce between the life of the spirit and the general organization of the community which, in one form or another, under the Roman Empire, in the Middle Ages, and under the modern

state system, has lasted down to the present day and has become part of the accepted and traditional order of society.

Yet the divorce was never complete. The men of action indeed occupied the seats of the mighty, bearing sway over the world and determining, or appearing to determine, its day-by-day events, whilst the men of thought remained, secluded and seemingly powerless, in the cloister and the study. Seen at any one moment the world was governed by practical men, with a few tame scribes at their beck and call to formulate their wishes and compose their decrees. But in reality the power of ideas was ever at work shaping and transforming the empires and kingdoms which seemed so humbly submissive to physical authority. If the recorded history of mankind is not simply a tale of successive rulers and dynasties but divides itself into epochs, each with clearly marked characteristics of its own, this is a testimony to the fact that the Pontius Pilates of the earth, notwithstanding their centurions, have not been the decisive force in its life and development. In the never-ceasing struggle between force and intelligence, between command and persuasion, the doers and the thinkers, the doers have won the pitched battles but the thinkers have won the campaigns. Nero and Diocletian, in all their pomp of power, could not check the growth of Christianity; nor could their successors impede the movement of ideas, anonymous and irresistible, which gave the Middle Ages, the Renaissance, the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries the intellectual climate and quality which are so unmistakable in retrospect.

Thus a kind of collaboration has in fact existed between the world of thought and the world of action, but it has been underground and unacknowledged, or, at the best, spasmodic and unequal. The doers and the routineers

have been in control; but at moments of crisis, when their eyes were forcibly opened to the movement of minds around them, they have made way for the thinkers.

But the repetition of this process, so far from rendering statesmen more amenable to the power of ideas, has only made them more suspicious and resentful, for it has created in their minds an unhappy association between the spread of ideas and the outbreak of political revolutions.

None but shallow minds can wax enthusiastic over forcible changes in the established order of society, with all their incalculable consequences of individual suffering and degradation. Statesmen and administrators are right in their abhorrence of revolutions, as doctors are right in shrinking from major operations. And no criticism can be too strong of those who, in tracing the movement of ideas, exult above all in their explosion. The 'revolutionary tradition', of which we have heard too much in so-called progressive writings, embodies a conception which is as wicked as it is absurd. It is absurd because Revolution and Tradition are two antithetical terms. To couple them together is nonsense. A particular revolution may, under unhappy circumstances, be necessary; but to repeat the process for the sake of a so-called tradition is to deprive the original revolution of its sense and to return to pure barbarism. It is wicked because to associate an idea, a product of pure spirit, with the notion of a physical upheaval is a kind of blasphemy against its very nature. It is to transpose the life of thought into the life of action, and into that life at its lowest and grossest level. It is not ideas that explode: it is bombs, and the other paraphernalia of those who prefer brute action to quiet thinking. Ideas are not manufactured in laboratories to explode. They are born in stillness, according to the order of Nature, and they grow and spread, unhurried but

unresting, according to those secret and excellent processes, unknown to courts and council-chambers, which convey authority where the minds of men feel authority to be due.

This silent collaboration between thought and action has been most effectually achieved by the nation which, for that very reason, has been the greatest bulwark in European life against violence and revolution. Englishmen delight, indeed, in proclaiming their distrust of the things of the mind and in exhibiting an artificial contrast, drawn to their own sardonic taste, between intellect and character. One of their traditional pleasures, fit almost to be ranked as a national sport, is to fling darts of good-natured irony against the lover of ideas. The whole vocabulary of the mental processes, 'logical', 'theoretical', 'intellectual', and the like, has been debased in the currency of ordinary speech so as automatically to provoke a sneer of contempt or a smile of pity. To be illogical on the continent of Europe is to be convicted of a social lapse and, in the case of a hardened offender, to qualify for the asylum. In England it is the apostle of logic who is considered a fit subject for confinement: he belongs to the study or the sanctum where the tides of real life cannot penetrate.

Yet in reality this parade of anti-intellectuality is but an islander's device. We need not pause to inquire into the motives which have prompted Englishmen to conceal so sedulously from the outer world the sources of their national success. An exaggerated shyness and sense of privacy, dislike of boisterous appreciation and clumsy mimicry, reluctance to formulate for others that which, in the changing processes of life, needs re-formulating for themselves year by year—all these have contributed to the adoption of the self-protective arrangement of English unintelligence. But let the foreigner only lift the curtain

and he will enter into a society which has achieved, more completely than any other in the modern world, the power of associating thought with action. England has been, since the close of the Middle Ages, the kingdom of the practical intelligence, the community in which the operations of the mind have been most closely related to the lives of men. In this sense, and it is the most important sense, Englishmen, though they would blush to hear it, have been the Greeks of the modern world. Other peoples may equal, though none can surpass, English achievement in the abstract sciences and imaginative literature. Newton, Faraday, and Clerk Maxwell, Shakespeare, Keats, and Shelley, may have fit compeers in other lands. What is pre-eminent in England is the mode in which, as with the Greeks, ideas have been wedded to the life and character and permanent institutions of the people. The harmonization between intelligence and life has been so complete that Englishmen themselves are apt to deny human authorship to their most original achievements and to assimilate them to the order of Nature. They will tell you that the Common Law, the Constitution, the overseas Empire, the British Commonwealth of Nations, with all the outpouring of intellectual effort each of these, with its complex varieties of excellence, implies, is a product of growth; and this theme indeed runs as a constant refrain through British political philosophy from Hooker and Burke, through Newman, to that scholar in action of to-day, Lord Balfour. But the word 'growth' in this connexion does not mean that human minds stand aloof and allow blind Nature to have its way. On the contrary, it testifies to a collaboration of human minds and wills so intricate, persistent, and intense, to so complete an association between the national intelligence and the national business, that the collective effort has resulted in individual anonymity. It is this smooth and easy

passage from individual thought to common action, from origination to organization, which has enabled the steady, uninterrupted development of British institutions and has made Englishmen, much as they affect to dislike being told so, the best exemplars in the modern world of successful intellectual co-operation.

Thus England, the mother of Parliaments and of civil liberty, has seen the products of her patient thought copied by other lands until institutions on the British model came to be regarded, from the Balkans to South America, as a patent of civilization and a passport to political respectability. Yet the very success of the English method has involved serious danger, both for the world at large and for England herself. For the world at large, because admiration of the English example has tended to repress, rather than to encourage, similar efforts to relate thought to action under the varying conditions of other countries. If the post-war years, with their stir of new life in so many parts of the world, are witnessing efforts of emancipation from what is inappropriate or deadening in forms borrowed from Britain, this testifies to a growing supremacy of the spirit over the letter, at which every intelligent student of institutions must rejoice.

But for England herself the development of the art of intellectual co-operation has had even more serious consequences, which must be mentioned here since they have proved of concern to the whole world. Her mastery of the method of relating ideas to action has led, first slowly and then by rapid stages, to a degradation in the character and quality of the ideas themselves.

So far, in this discussion, when we have spoken of ideas we have assumed that we were concerned with the realm of the spirit. Civilization is the control of environment by man. Man is a spiritual being, and his control involves the

mastery of the blind forces of Nature for human, that is for spiritual, ends. The result is a society in which men are free to live a truly human life and to perfect their spiritual faculties. That is the essence of the Greek achievement; and that too was the conscious aim of the long line of thinkers, Greek, Roman, and medieval, who have occupied themselves with the problem of the right ordering of society. When, at the end of the Middle Ages, the English and other European peoples took over the burden of this inquiry, they maintained the same aim and direction. Thus the characteristically English achievements to which allusion has already been made, such as the Common Law and the Constitution, were political achievements in the truest sense of that term. Politics is but applied morality; and the object of these and other political achievements was to make the community a better place to live in: so that life itself might be raised to a higher power.

But while in England and elsewhere men were applying fresh minds and wills to the study and application of the ideals of the older thinkers, new forces were breaking into the realm of knowledge itself. In the seventeenth century Science slipped unobserved into the quiet garden of thought, and from that day to this there has been schism in Eden.

What we have been accustomed to name 'science' and 'the scientific spirit' is far from being what its name signifies. It is not knowledge (*scientia*) in itself: nor is it, as is sometimes supposed, a method for applying knowledge to practical life. It is true that 'modern science', as it is called, has greatly added to the sum of human knowledge, and also that it has transformed the face of the globe by its practical applications. But neither of these constitutes the originality of its contribution. Much knowledge had been accumulated in the world before the seventeenth century, and, as we have seen, Englishmen were developing, quite independently of

'science', out of the preoccupations of the earlier thinkers, a method far subtler and more complex than could be devised in a laboratory, for relating thought to action in the field of public affairs. What is new in modern science is not its method for applying knowledge to action but its method for deriving new knowledge from old knowledge. It has developed a method and a discipline, appropriate to particular domains, for pressing back the bounds of ignorance and has trained men in the concentration and the love of detail necessitated by such a mode of inquiry.

In the course of three centuries this method and discipline, operating with added momentum generation by generation, have produced an upheaval in human affairs beside which the schemes of professional revolutionaries seem childish and amiable fancies. To this external aspect of the effects of science, and its consequences for the art of government, allusion has already been made on an earlier page. Here we are concerned with the effects in the world of thought.

The influence of science upon the world's intellectual life has been twofold. It has affected the traditional balance of human studies, and it has affected the relationship between those studies and human conduct.

It has affected the traditional conditions of scholarship by introducing a method and a discipline which have proved marvellously appropriate in some fields whilst largely or wholly inappropriate in others. As a result there has been an increasingly rapid advance in the studies to which the new methods apply, whilst the rest, proceeding at their own leisurely pace, have seemed to stagnate and therefore to have lost much of their interest and importance. Thus the old unity of knowledge, the *Universitas* affirmed in the very title given to the medieval seats of learning, has been endangered and barriers of misunderstanding, and some-

times even of jealous hostility, set up in the very kingdom of fellowship and understanding. Science, the younger brother, has won successes undreamed of by the schoolmen and unpalatable to not a few of their successors.

The division thus set up is clearly marked and familiar. Yet it is difficult to define. It is customary to distinguish between human and non-human studies: between the studies bearing on man and the so-called exact and natural sciences. Yet this is not accurate; for the scientific method has been applied, and with increasing success, to some, if not all, of the human studies. Again it is said that the distinction is between the abstract and the concrete: between the studies which divest life of its warmth and colour and reduce it to measurable and ponderable units and those which try to comprehend it in all the richness of its full reality. This is closer to the truth, for it points to the distinctive characteristic of the new method and discipline, its power to 'extract from the complicated totality of everyday experience just those phenomena which can be observed, measured, generalized, and, if necessary, repeated'.¹ These words, from the pages of the most penetrating recent interpreter of that New World whose very soul has been so largely fashioned by the new forces, carry us near to the heart of the problem. Modern science takes its rise indeed in mathematics, the queen of the abstract studies, whose cold grandeur had long ago fascinated Pythagoras and Plato; and her inspiration and discipline have dominated its devotees ever since. Little did the Greek thinkers imagine, when they lifted their gaze to that serene throne, that her austere influence, so seemingly remote from the ordinary concerns of mankind, was destined to wield a power over human affairs beside which the sway of an emperor is as

¹ *The Golden Day: A Study in American Experience and Culture*, by Lewis Mumford, Oxford, 1927, p. 22.

zero to infinity. 'In the year 1500', Dr. Whitehead has lately reminded us, 'Europe knew less than Archimedes, who died in 212 B.C.'¹ It is the application of the new method and discipline to the exploration of the realm glimpsed by Pythagoras and just barely trodden by Archimedes which has carried their successors past the milestones left by Copernicus and Newton to the spacious areas where tens of thousands of scientific workers are labouring so fruitfully to-day.

And yet this does not sum up the whole difference, or even its most important element. For the change in the general character of modern knowledge is far more than a change in method. That the modern investigator has immensely better means for deriving new knowledge from old than were available to Archimedes is no doubt important. But what is more important is the aim towards which his studies are consciously directed. For in the search for knowledge, as in every human activity, the aim dominates the action. To be conscious of his direction is the prerogative of man, as distinguished from the blind automatism of animals, just as to control that direction is the prerogative of a civilized society.

Now the deepest and strongest effect which modern science has exerted upon the world of thought is that it has tempted men to forget the end in the means. The devotee of the scientific method, whether engaged upon 'pure research' or upon the practical applications of knowledge, has his whole being concentrated on the 'how'—on the successful use of his scientific instrument for adding knowledge to knowledge. Too deeply absorbed in his highly skilled task and too remote from the point at which his specialism branched off from the main high-road, he

¹ *Science and the Modern World*, by A. N. Whitehead, Cambridge, 1926, p. 7.

too often forgets to pause and reflect on the 'why'—on the relation between his inquiry and the general interests of mankind. Thus, stationed in service on an outpost, he loses his vision of the whole kingdom: and, however devoted that service, it must fail in quality and waver in direction unless systematic means are provided, as at present they seldom are, for maintaining the connexion with the larger purpose of his work.

It is this tendency in modern science to pursue facts for the sake of facts, to exalt the means and forget the end, which has given rise to the accusation so often levelled against it as an agency of materialism. No impeachment could be more untrue either of the spirit of the pioneers of the scientific method or of its leading exponents in every generation. Nevertheless, there is unhappily a large element of truth in the criticism. Science has done damage to the spiritual interests of mankind not by what it has achieved but by what it has forgotten in the moment of achievement. Volumes, almost whole libraries, have been written in recent generations on the conflict between Science and Religion. The tragedy of the situation is that the phrase is misapplied. Science and Religion have too seldom been in conflict because they have too seldom met. For the last three centuries their minds have moved in separate orbits, Science giving all her attention to the 'how' and Religion holding to the old inquiry into the 'why'. Some few of the greatest minds indeed, such as Pascal, reached out to the higher unity; but, like Pythagoras and Archimedes in their own field, they were pioneers ahead of the main movement. In general, the older studies, centring round philosophy, have stood aloof, in growing isolation, from those who have made use of the new methods, and this division in the ranks of the thinkers has not only weakened their general civilizing influence but has enabled the newer

studies to be drawn into a debasing dependence upon the world of action.

The last few generations have witnessed by far the greatest change that has ever taken place in the life and habits of mankind. That change, entitled by historians, in retrospect, as the Industrial Revolution, culminated in the World War, by far the greatest upheaval that has ever occurred in human annals. What produced the Industrial Revolution? It is customary to speak—and the phrase is used on an earlier page—of the great inventions. But the inventions themselves were no more remarkable than many exploits of the human mind in earlier ages. Classical antiquity and the Far East indeed both claim paternity for some of the ideas which were taken up anew in the second half of the eighteenth century. What constituted the novelty at that epoch was not the power of invention itself but the faculty, peculiarly developed in England of organizing that power for practical and, above all, for commercially profitable purposes. Newton was a more original mind than Watt, and Watt than Stephenson, but it is Stephenson and his fellow-organizers who have revolutionized human existence. What produced the Great War? Historians may investigate the conflicts of interest which acted both as its determining and its predisposing causes. But those conflicts of interest were no fiercer or more deeply rooted than many similar conflicts between rival peoples in earlier ages. Athens and Sparta, Rome and Carthage, stood ranged against one another in a far more permanent opposition than the peoples of the Entente and of the Central Powers. Yet the Peloponnesian and Carthaginian wars were mere local skirmishes which slew men by hundreds, whilst the war between the Entente and the Central Powers involved three-quarters of the globe and drove millions to their doom.

What is the cause of this cruel and unreasonable disproportion? Science is the cause. It is Science which has changed the life and habits of mankind and created an interdependent world society. It is Science again which has provided the weapons which have transformed war from a contest of chivalry to a collective massacre.

Science, we say, is the cause. But in what sense? Does the work of scientific invention, after six or seven generations of development, reveal a process of growth, with an organic life and meaning of its own, like the work of the anonymous Englishmen who fashioned the Common Law and the Constitution? Has the Industrial Revolution been a great achievement of international intellectual co-operation, directed towards the welfare of mankind? Or has Science merely lent her brain, as the unskilled workman lends his labour, to be the instrument of the purposes of others? Science carried out the Industrial Revolution. But did she will it? Science carried out the destruction of the Great War. But did she will it?

To ask these questions is to answer them. Science, by its very nature as an intellectual power, abhors violence and upheaval. Between Science and Revolution, Science and Warfare, there is no possible kinship. Both in her aims and her methods, Science is utterly opposed to them. Her home is in a realm of the spirit into which the powers of disorder not only do not penetrate but of which they cannot even conceive the existence. How then can we explain the ghastly paradox that Reason has become the servant of Unreason, and Science, who should be ministering to the amelioration of human existence, is found playing the horrid role of 'procureess to the lords of hell'?

The answer is that Science is helpless. She has lost control over the results of her own thinking. Content to add knowledge to knowledge, she hands on her discoveries

to others, to make of them what they will. And those others, for whom she has become indispensable, whose lives and habits and institutions she has transformed, so far from looking to her for leadership, regard her as a convenient handmaiden. Did Science will the war? Surely not.

Hers not to reason why;
Hers but to make men die.

Here we reach the uttermost result of the fatal divorce between the 'how' and the 'why'. For to whom have the diligent servitors of method handed over the determination of aims? Who, while the laboratories are reeking with her labours over the 'how', are taking over from the listless grasp of Science the great issues of human policy? The reply has already been given on an earlier page. The control that Science has so carelessly abandoned has found no one equipped to accept it. In the abdication of Mind, Matter cannot take command. So to our double question there is a single and ominous answer. Who willed the Industrial Revolution? Nobody. Who willed the World War? Nobody. The two greatest changes in the history of mankind were not brought about by mankind. They were brought about by unreasoning forces—since reason is the prerogative of man, let us boldly say by animal forces, using man's intelligence as their instrument. Mankind, in other words, is no longer master of its destiny. Civilization has ceased to exist. Its outward form survives, the tribute of man's enslaved intelligence to the dark forces which enthrall him. But its reality is no more.

Thus stated, the conclusion may seem too summary. The comfortable reader may feel the picture to be overdrawn. Let him pause to reflect, in the light of our argument, on the considerations set forth in the opening pages. Aghast at the chain of consequences unrolled by the events of 1914, the statesmen at the Peace Conference set up a League

of Nations. The object of that League was to ensure the world against a repetition of the disaster—in other words, to recover control over 'events'. Nearly a decade has passed since the guns ceased speaking. Has control been recovered? Has the establishment of a League of Nations ensured the peace of the world? Has it mastered the forces making for disorder? Has it set to work to deal methodically, in the spirit of Science, with the germs of future conflict? Every well informed observer of international politics must reluctantly answer these questions in the negative. The peace of the world is not assured. Whether the League will be able to affirm its authority by checking the next outbreak of violence no one can predict. It depends, and must necessarily depend, on public opinion—that is, under present conditions, on the view taken at the moment by individual peoples, and the Governments responsible to them, of their own policies and interests. The League has not mastered the forces of disorder or dealt methodically with the germs of future conflict because the peoples, in their lack of understanding, have not wished it to do so; would, in fact, have offered violent resistance, each in defence of its own fancied interests, had any practical advance been made in that direction. Every three months some of the leading statesmen of the world assemble at Geneva. What do they do there? Are they free to consider the general interests of mankind? Can they plan how to recover control over events? Can they set to work to transform civilization from an appearance to a reality? No doubt, as men of reason and feeling, they would earnestly desire to do so; but, as every one knows, in actual fact they are obliged to spend their efforts upon matters of far lesser significance. Nor can criticism attach to them, either individually or collectively, for thus neglecting the whole for the part, and sometimes even for an infinitesimal

fraction of a part. They are not scholars but statesmen. They are not independent but representatives of parliaments and peoples. They are not free, like the men of thought, to let their minds roam over the whole scheme of public affairs and to fix on this or that problem which their diagnosis selects for immediate treatment. They may come attended by trains of experts, amongst whom the intellectual sometimes occupies a modest place. But they are no freer than the experts whom they employ. They are the servants of their peoples, dependent, that is, too often on the caprice of ignorance, passion or greed, and the other devils of unreason. No, if men point to the establishment of the League of Nations as evidence of the recovery of civilization, of the supremacy of human intelligence and human will over the blind forces of chaos, let us frankly admit that it has not yet been enabled to achieve, has indeed hardly yet been permitted to attempt, the task men expected of it after the Armistice.

Thus the means upon which men relied for the recovery of their control over events have hitherto proved insufficient. Civilization, in the true spiritual sense of the term, has ceased to exist. And even its outward semblance, the proud and imposing apparatus of wealth and material power, exists only on sufferance. It has been granted a reprieve until the next war—that war for which Science is preparing and which statesmen are powerless to arrest. ‘The military mind always imagines that the next war will be on the same lines as the last. That has never been the case and never will be. One of the great factors in the next war will obviously be aircraft. The potentialities of aircraft attack on a large scale are almost incalculable, but it is clear that such attack, owing to its crushing moral effect on a nation, may impress public opinion to the point of disarming the Government and thus become decisive.’

These are not the words of an amateur employing an imagination untrained by experience. They are the words of the greatest soldier of the age, meditating on the transformation of an art to which he has devoted his whole life and thought. And Marshal Foch goes on to explain the nature of the 'crushing moral effect' which he anticipates may end the next war so shortly after its outbreak. 'The carrying power of the aeroplane is increasing. Improvements are made almost daily enabling greater and greater weights to be carried.' (This was written before the recent transatlantic flights.) 'These developments introduce an entirely new method for the large-scale use of poison gas. By the use of bombs, which are becoming increasingly efficient and of greater capacity, not only have armies become more vulnerable, but the centres of population situated in the rear, and whole regions inhabited by civilians, will be threatened. Chemical warfare thus acquires the power to produce more terrible effects over much larger areas.' And the British authority who cites these statements appends an official British account of a successful experiment in dropping a 4,000 lb. demolition bomb which made a crater averaging 64 feet in diameter with a rim about 5 feet high.¹

Who has increased the carrying power of the aeroplane? Who has improved the construction of bombs? Who has developed the large-scale use of poison gas? Not the men of action who employ them, not the young heroes who, in devotion to duty, risk their own lives in conveying these means of wholesale destruction, but the men of thought. If the art of war has been brought to a point where it seems destined, unless checked by higher forces, to destroy both itself and civilization through the perfecting of its

¹ *Journal of the Royal Institute of International Affairs*, May 1927, pp. 145-7.

powers of offence, it is Science, and Science alone, which is responsible.

But Science has never accepted the responsibility. She knows nothing of ends. She is concerned only with means. And, even if she turned her mind to ends, how is she to give voice to her conclusions? Men are not accustomed to listen to her on matters extending beyond the narrow province which she has herself delimited. Moreover, she has no appropriate organ through which to speak. Unskilled in the arts of assemblies and parliaments, she does not know how to set herself to address humanity.

Yet she owes it to herself and to mankind to accept the responsibility which she has too long disclaimed. The men of action, left to themselves for a century and a half, have reduced civilization to a shadow. They are powerless, admittedly powerless, to retrieve what has been lost. It is for the men of thought to assert themselves and insist on a renewal of the collaboration which is the only true basis of civilization. That the task is uncongenial and contrary to lifelong habit and disposition, there is no need to emphasize: nor that the very idea will evoke the ingenious pretexts for evasion with which the intellectual is always so ready when confronted with urgent and disagreeable practical tasks. But to all such arguments Plato has long since given a classic answer: 'You have forgotten, my friend, that it is not the law's concern that any one class in a State should live surpassingly well. Rather it contrives a good life for the whole State, harmonizing the citizens by persuasion and compulsion, and making them share with one another the advantage which each class can contribute to the community . . . You must, therefore, descend by turns to dwell with the rest of the city, and must be accustomed to see these dark objects, for when you are accustomed you will be able to see a thousand

times better than those who dwell there . . . because you have seen the truth of what is beautiful and just and good. And so your city and our city will become a waking reality and not a dream like most existing cities, which are peopled by men fighting about shadows and quarrelling for office as though that were a notable good. Whereas the truth surely is this, that that city wherein those who are to rule are least anxious for office must have the best and most stable constitution.'¹

Thus the recovery of civilization depends, as has been said on an earlier page, on the use made in public affairs of those who know: on adjusting the available resources of good will, expert knowledge and intellectual and moral leadership to the needs of the post-war world. The problem of the recovery of civilization is the problem of the relation between learning and leadership.

§ 3

THE PROBLEMS OF INTELLECTUAL LIFE.

But before knowledge can take its rightful place in the world of action it must be at unity with itself. The schism that has resulted from the rise of modern science must be healed so that the authority of the reunited world of thought can be brought to bear on the problems of civilization.

There are thus two distinct stages in the development of a programme of international intellectual co-operation. There is, first, the promotion of a unity in the world of thought itself and the setting up of an organization through which that unity can secure authoritative public expression. There is, secondly, the working out of a relationship between the best thought of mankind, thus brought together for the

¹ Plato, *Republic*, 519-20.

first time through a representative organ on the international plane, and the powers of government. This second problem, upon which the whole future of the art of government depends, must be left for later treatment. Suffice it to repeat once more here that the future, not of democracy only but of constitutional government as an effective power in the ordering of human affairs, depends upon its association with the arts of thought. Unless regular and recognized methods of collaboration are worked out between the thinkers and the doers, between expert knowledge and the representatives of the public interest, power will continue to pass in increasing measure into private and irresponsible hands, and the drift to disaster will become irresistible.

How can unity be brought about in the world of knowledge? The answer is not difficult. By the promotion of systematic arrangements for the discussion of the interests common to all who are engaged in the pursuit of knowledge. Once this discussion has taken place it will certainly be found that the division in the ranks of knowledge is more apparent than real. It has been maintained not so much through any irreconcilable difference regarding the fundamental issues of intellectual life as through lack of organization, through the absence of any regular means of association between workers in different fields. This can best be made clear by a brief analysis of some of the problems which would inevitably find a place in any such general discussion.

I. The first matter to be discussed would naturally be the value of organized co-operation in the promotion of the world's intellectual life. The scholars in council would wish to justify to themselves and, above all, to their more sceptical colleagues, the usefulness of spending precious days, drawn from a too-brief working life, upon the irksome duties of conference and committee. The scholar, as Plato knew, is an individualist *par excellence*. His natural instinct

is for seclusion ; and when he emerges from it, his mind filled with the absorbing interest of its own contemplations, it is difficult for him to adjust himself to the rhythm of a business discussion. A committee is a device for cutting short the flow of thought at the point where a practical decision can be taken. But it is the very characteristic of the mind of the true scholar to resist the premature curtailment of a flow of ideas and to 'follow the argument whithersoever it leads'. It is not surprising, then, that scholars tend to abhor and, if possible, to avoid committees.

This disinclination of thinkers for the forms of associated action is the most deep-lying reason for their lack of organization, and consequent weakness, not only in the life of to-day but in all ages. An interesting book might be written on the immense waste that has resulted in the intellectual field from this persistent inertia. It will suffice to mention some examples from a single field, brought forward in a recent study of the services rendered to learning by that prince of international intellectual co-operation, Erasmus. Before the age of printed books, scholars had access to traditional knowledge through MSS. 'It requires an effort of thought', says Mr. Allen,¹ 'to realize with what difficulty men worked when they had only MSS. No two MSS. could be identical page for page without great trouble taken', *and such trouble was not taken*. '... With all MSS. unlike, a scholar might number the page of his own, but he could not refer from these to the pages of a friend. Here printing brought an improvement. Every page of a book was identical with the corresponding page in every copy of the same edition ; and a man might direct a friend to a page, and even a line, which was at once to be found. Yet this advantage was not at first perceived. ... The first

¹ *Erasmus' Services to Learning*, by P. S. Allen, Oxford, 1925. (British Academy publication.) The italics in the following are my own.

person to whom it occurred to number the leaves of a book was the Cologne printer Arnold ter Hoernen, who, in printing a sermon delivered in 1470, put numbers, not at the top corners, but in the middle of the right-hand margins of the rectos. *His example was not quickly followed.* The method of signatures was more familiar to the masters of medieval book-craft; and so they remained for some years as the only means of distinguishing pages. . . . Another sign of the want of co-operation among scholars is the long time that elapsed before literature was divided into small sections for convenience of reference. . . . Even the Bible, the object of so much study, had no chapters till Stephen Langton made them in the thirteenth century; the verses it was left for Robert Stephanus to divide and number . . . as he fled from Paris to Geneva, when branded with heresy in 1554.'

'The lack of co-operation', continues Mr. Allen, 'was shown in another way. In the earliest printed books it is rare to find any indication of the MSS. used. . . . In this silence the early printers were no doubt following the custom of the makers of the MSS. and reflecting their outlook. Each MS. was an individual thing, written for sale to others or for a man's own use. . . . In either case the mention of the source was unimportant. To the writer it was known and there was no need to record it.'

Could there be a better example of the way in which the most conscientious minds sometimes ignore the most obvious practical duties than this slowness of scholars to perceive the advantages of these simple devices for making their work useful to others? Thanks to Erasmus and his fellow-labourers, the invention of printing was turned to the advantage of intellectual workers. But that these results were not attained automatically or without the most strenuous and often heartbreaking effort his own letters and

the story told by his latest biographer reveal. Are we so certain that in the modern world there are not inventions as significant to the world's intellectual life as the printing press of which scholars have not yet known how to make full use, which perhaps they have even allowed to be singularly misused? The question cannot be answered off-hand. It is for the scholars themselves to achieve, through corporate effort, what was impossible in the day of Erasmus: to follow the development of technical inventions bearing on intellectual life and to see that their possibilities of helpfulness are rightly developed and their abuse effectually checked.

II. Another matter calling for constant watchfulness and discussion by a representative organ of the world's intellectual life is the whole series of problems which may be grouped under the heading of specialization. We are referring here not to the special development of branches of knowledge for practical purposes, which must be dealt with separately, but with studies undertaken purely with a view to the advancement of learning. The immense accumulation of knowledge and the increasing subdivision of the field of study are rendering it more and more difficult for the specialist to remain an educated man—a man, that is, who, as Aristotle defined him long ago, has a trained judgement resulting from his general familiarity with the best of what is thought and known

Two broad but related fields of discussion are here opened out—the effects of specialization upon education and its effects upon learning itself. Both need the fullest and frankest investigation by those whose experience, position, and judgement, best qualify them to undertake it.

The influence of specialization upon education has been tenaciously and, on the whole, not unsuccessfully resisted by those who hold fast to the idea that the object of an

educational system is not so much to convey knowledge as to prepare the younger generation to play its part in the life of its community. This resistance has been strengthened by the efforts, or the inertia, of those who are unwilling to see new subjects inserted into an already crowded curriculum. In the protracted struggle that thus resulted between the 'classical' and the 'modern' schools the general result has not been unsatisfactory. As the lengthening of hours and the extension of subjects soon attained the fixed limits of juvenile docility, emphasis was necessarily diverted from subjects to methods. The older school was stirred out of its complacent routine, whilst the newer was compelled to justify the claims of its own studies by demonstrating their teaching value. Thus what might have been a serious danger has, in some countries at any rate, proved a blessing in disguise. Indeed, the resistance to specialization has sometimes even been carried too far and developed into a resistance against knowledge itself. There are devotees of method who, in their eagerness to assert that the imparting of knowledge is not the primary function of education, have even minimized the value of school training in the concentration and exact thinking upon which the assimilation of knowledge depends.

When we turn, however, to the field of pure learning itself, we are met with a different picture. Here specialization has had free play, unchecked by the limiting factors operating in the field of education. Men equipped with the new power of adding knowledge to knowledge have applied scientific method to study after study, so that the body of knowledge has now attained gigantic dimensions. The intellectual problem with which the learned world is confronted, as a result of this situation, is best set forth by taking examples drawn from different fields.

The League of Nations International Committee on In-

tellectual Co-operation recently summoned a conference of experts in the bibliography of the biological sciences. The first step taken at this conference was to define the meaning and limits of biology. In order to do this satisfactorily, it was found necessary to classify it into seven large and important subdivisions, such as physiology, botany, zoology, and genetics. In the field thus delimited it was stated that 50,000 original contributions to knowledge were now annually made and that the number was rapidly increasing: this excluded the whole domain of medicine proper, in spite of its close and evident relationship to physiology and hence to the whole field of biology. Here are the elements of the intellectual problem which confronts the working biologist. He wishes to advance human knowledge in the field of biology. He wishes also to remain, or rather to become, a master of biology, a worthy successor to Darwin and his compeers. He wishes also to become a power in the broad world of learning, a worthy successor to Aristotle, Erasmus, and Leibnitz. He wishes also to be a good citizen, with a sufficient knowledge of the world's affairs to bring his knowledge to bear upon the needs of his generation. Finally, he wishes to remain a man, with all that that involves in the life of thought and taste and feeling and action. Faced with this difficult series of obligations, his most immediate daily task, not to speak of his career, is concerned with his own specialism. Here, dividing 50,000 by 7, he has some 7,000 items of thought or information, drawn from the laboratories of the world, to deal with year by year: that is, an average of twenty learned papers a day. No wonder that he shuns the task and, in sheer self-defence, physical and intellectual, circumscribes narrowly and ever more narrowly his field of study. But what is the result? If he yields to this process and becomes increasingly absorbed in his first-hand

work, he becomes year by year less of a botanist and, *a fortiori*, less of a biologist. He may remain, or become, a good citizen, a good husband and father, and a good musician or mountain climber; but between this side of his life and his researches there will be a great gulf fixed. There will be a duality in his life which will make itself fatally felt at any crisis that calls for a decisive choice of direction—a duality corresponding exactly to that which has characterized the life of civilization itself since the close of the Greek period. No wonder that, when he is dragged out into the light as an expert on the cattle-plague or the boll-weevil or the problem of population, to set the treasures of his thought before men far less indispensable than he to the world's life, he does not always succeed in conveying a sense of the natural authority of knowledge.

The dangers of specialization are even more clearly apparent in the field of human studies. Here the process of delimitation, however necessary for working purposes, can be an active agent of mischief unless it is regarded as purely provisional. History, we are told, is a science. So is Economics. So is Politics. So is Sociology. So is Geography. So is Philology. So are Archaeology, Anthropology, Palaeography, and the whole train of ancillary disciplines. There are even, we would not be disposed to deny, sciences of Comparative Literature, Comparative Art, and comparative Music. The application of scientific method to each and all of these domains has no doubt greatly advanced human knowledge and revealed many valuable truths. But is there not a danger that, in thus prosecuting a minute analysis into these different activities, human science will degenerate into a riot of abstractions and Man himself will be forgotten? The problem here is different and more subtle than that which confronts the worker in the exact or natural sciences. The physicist, the

chemist, and the biologist, may have lost their relationship with the larger developments of their study but, within their own field, their judgement remains sound and sure. But in the human sciences this is not the case. An economist who knows no politics, a sociologist who knows no history, a historian who knows no geography, is not a scholar but a laughing-stock. We all of us have in mind some of the exploits of such 'wise fools' (to apply the term used of a British monarch) when the excitement of the war led them to give vent to opinions on matters outside the field of their own researches. Each new change in the world's outward life is a death-blow to a whole tribe of theories and inevitabilities, offsprings of that strange alliance between knowledge and *naïveté* which has been so marked a feature in the history of the human sciences.

How to counteract these effects of the development of specialization it is for the scholars themselves to discuss and determine. But the very fact of the assembling of representatives of the different domains of study, exact, natural and human alike, will serve to set the problem, for the first time, in its true light and to emphasize the urgent need for some regular means of conference on vital intellectual problems. 'The discoveries of the nineteenth century', writes Dr. Whitehead, 'were in the direction of professionalism, so that we are left with no expansion of wisdom and with greater need of it. Wisdom is the fruit of a balanced development. It is this balanced growth of individuality which it should be the aim of education to secure. The most useful discoveries of the immediate future would concern the furtherance of this aim without detriment to the necessary intellectual professionalism.'¹ To whom should the world look for the making and testing

¹ *Science and the Modern World*, p. 246.

of such discoveries if not to those who are most conscious of the need for them, the chosen and experienced representatives of the best thought of the present-day world?

III. The next set of problems on which regular discussion is urgently needed can be summed up under the forbidding title of Finance. They arise from the simple fact that men of learning, individually poor and disinclined to pursue wealth for its own sake, collectively require substantial material means for the carrying on of their work.

This problem has existed in all ages—at least, from the time when Herodotus composed, for the delectation of an intellectual public, his memorable account of the interview between Solon and Croesus. The biographies of thinkers and artists are filled with the anxieties and the hindrances resulting from

That eternal want of pence
Which ever vexes public men;

whilst the movement of thought itself has been delayed, and even arrested, by the material obstacles placed in the path of its exponents. Church and State and private munificence have, in various ages, each in its own way, attempted to find if not a remedy at least a palliative for the difficulty. The cloister, the Court, and the nobleman's mansion, have given bed and board and leisure and, above all, privacy to many of those who, age by age, have felt themselves to be dedicated to the public service of thinking. How many have been passed over by these haphazard methods of assistance and have fallen by the way without bearing their burden of thought to its goal, we shall never know: any more than we can estimate how many of her own finest offspring Science herself, most ruthless of parents, allowed to be annihilated in the world war by weapons of her own devising.

But in the modern world, and particularly in this post-

war age, the problem has assumed a new and even graver form. It is not simply now a question of aiding those who have chosen the intellectual life as a vocation. It is a question of saving the intellectual life itself from extinction, threatened on many sides at once by dangers and temptations such as it has never had to combat before.

The problem of providing an adequate material basis to ensure the continuance and steady development of the world's intellectual life is twofold. It concerns, on the one hand, the recruitment into the recognized ranks of thought of those whose gifts mark them out for rendering this form of service to their generation. It concerns also the provision of adequate facilities, both moral and material, for those who have been enabled to choose this vocation.

Both these aspects of the questions open up a large series of considerations which should form the subject of authoritative inquiry by a representative authority. Only the mere fringe of the subject can be touched upon in these pages.

The intellectual worker is not attracted by riches. It is doubtful, indeed, whether riches in themselves continue to exert, even in other walks of life, their traditional attraction. Mere wealth as a criterion of success and reputation is being less and less esteemed as each new profession organizes, within its own ranks, its own terms of representation and standards of excellence. An age which has witnessed the successful establishment of an International Chamber of Commerce, thus consecrating the supremacy of wisdom and experience in occupations vulgarly supposed to be dominated by the motive of profit, is not one in which the appeal of riches should be held out to those who have hitherto been immune from it. But those who contemplate devoting their lives to the things of the mind have a right, when they are making their choice, to an assurance that they will truly be enabled to do so. To enter what is called

a learned profession is to eschew riches. The neophyte knows that the pomp and luxury of the world, the externals of power and even the comforts upon which so much of health and ease of mind and body depend will not be for him. He leaves to others, whose natures are less finely mixed, less attuned to the call of the unseen, the applause of multitudes and the favours of the mighty. All he asks in return is the certainty that he will be left free, in the fullest sense of the term, to be faithful to his vocation. Translated into concrete terms, this means that the profession of teaching and the profession of intellectual creation in the field of letters, science, and art, should everywhere be assured of an income which will enable its votaries to do justice to their task. In the world of to-day this implies, not only means sufficient to keep body and soul together and to support a wife and family, but an adequate margin for books, for travel, and for the amenities of a civilized life. There has, indeed, been a great development in recent generations in the provision of amenities for the general public. But it must not be forgotten that the intellectual and the artist are solitaries. The general public may be expected to aquiesce in reading public books in, or drawn from, public libraries and to be satisfied with public performances of musical works and the public enjoyment of pictures and statues in public galleries. This is not only inevitable: it is right and proper and a wise application of the Greek example. But it will never meet the more intimate needs of the true intellectual. A scholar without a private library, an artist within bare walls, a musician too poor to afford a good instrument, are divested of part of their personality. These things for the intellectual are not merely instruments but symbols: they are part of the communion of the Saints to which his life is dedicated: they maintain and nourish his living relationship with the

masters of his world—not those earthly masters from whom he receives his monthly or yearly pay and his patent of appointment, but those kings of the invisible world to whom he swore fealty when he chose his vocation.

It is not within the scope of these pages to press this argument farther: the decisions on this matter rest with a host of authorities, governmental, municipal, semi-public, and even private, amid conditions of infinite variety. But these decisions will be taken in a very different spirit, and may well reveal a remarkable change in substance, when the world of learning has discovered how to speak with a united voice and to impress the lords of the purse with a more vivid sense of its social importance. In the present-day world, individuals and organizations have often laid undue stress on the material rewards of their labours. But that is no reason why the devotees of the spirit should consider themselves bound, by contrast, to a quixotic asceticism. There is a golden mean between too little and too much to which, here as elsewhere, it is the part of wisdom to attain.

But the provision of adequate remuneration for the individual intellectual worker is only a part, and not the most difficult part, of this question. There still remains the whole series of problems, specifically modern in character, arising from the increased complexity, and consequent expense, of the material equipment and instruments of learning. The medieval man of learning could weave the fabric of his thought in the seclusion of a cell or a college chamber without a sense of want or even inconvenience. His tools, such as they were, were ready to hand; and, as was said on an earlier page, he paid scant regard to the public beyond the range of his oral influence. To-day, in our larger and more interdependent world, the conditions both of the production and the diffusion of thought have been transformed. Almost every branch of study now

requires for its effective prosecution a costly outfit. Side by side with the library, which in its most recent form has developed a technique and a significance for the intellectual and social life of civilization unimaginable to older generations, there are the observatory, the laboratory, in all its many varieties, the museum, which is becoming equally diversified, the public archives, and many other special kinds of material needed by particular disciplines. In addition, there is the problem, ever more pressing as the years go on, of the international diffusion of the results already achieved—the development of bibliography in all its range and variety. Mention must also be made of the increase in the cost of printing, resulting from the war, which has prevented many valuable works from seeing the light and caused many others to be published, as their prefaces reveal, in sadly truncated form. Nor can a passing word be omitted upon another kindred problem—the difficulties involved in arranging for the postal transmission across national frontiers of publications of recognized intellectual value. These have been explored but, as yet, far from overcome by the League of Nations Committee on Intellectual Co-operation. Too little disposition has so far been shown by individual Governments to follow the example of the United States in the service provided through the Smithsonian Institute at Washington; and the authorities of the Universal Postal Union have not yet realized, or had instructions to reveal that they realize, the importance of making the relatively trifling sacrifice of revenue needed to facilitate the international transmission of this very special class of printed matter. Yet it is not too much to say that its effective circulation throughout the universities and other centres of the world's thought is indispensable not only to the development of intellectual life upon an international basis but to the survival of civilization itself.

Whose business is it to ensure that the scholar has the material means which will enable his intelligence to fulfil its task? Who is to supply the canvas and easel, colours, palette, and brushes, which each separate variety of intellectual requires for the practice of his art?

To ask these questions is to realize that no adequate attempt has yet been made to answer them. They have indeed hardly yet been studied systematically or in the light of any general principle. Individual nations and individual studies can point with pride to this or that monumental intellectual achievement. France has her *Encyclopaedia* and her immortal dictionary; Germany her *Monumenta Germaniae Historica* and her *Corpus Inscriptionum*; Great Britain her *Oxford English Dictionary* and her *Dictionary of National Biography*; Italy her unique achievements in archaeology; and the United States her large-scale enterprises in bibliography. These are but examples cited at random designed to show the nature of the problem and the haphazard solutions it has so far received; they reveal also, and perhaps even more strikingly, the tendency to conceive and carry through enterprises of this large-scale character in a national rather than an international domain. Those from whom alone, in too many cases, the funds for work on this scale can be obtained are more easily interested in national than in international projects. Thus financial need has operated as a force tending, through no conscious desire in the mind of this or that Maecenas, to weaken the international solidarity of learning.

In what direction should we look for a way out of these difficulties? The first prerequisite, clearly, is a survey of the field, a study both of the projects aided in the past and of those for which help is needed in the future. But who is to undertake this survey and how should it be organized?

It would seem natural to suggest that each branch of study should set to work to report on its own achievements and its own needs. An inventory of this kind, conceived on an international basis, is surely one of the first tasks which a responsible body of intellectual workers would wish to undertake in its own field. When the facts have been assembled, and the desiderata authoritatively enumerated in order of importance and urgency, then it will be easier to frame principles of policy both for finance and organization. But it may well be asked even now whether we have not reached a point in the development of civilization when learning, as such, should be corporately endowed.

If this were done, either in the form of trusts for individual studies or for a more comprehensive intellectual agency or agencies, scholars would at last be free to determine for themselves, and according to their own judgement of need and importance, what projects should be collectively undertaken. Even a relatively small provision permanently ensured for History or Astronomy or Archaeology or Biology would not only be of very great practical value but would also convey a moral benefit and sense of relief from chronic mendicancy that would be out of all proportion to the size of the sum involved. For the first time in the world's history, learning, the protégée of civilization, would attain an independent status corresponding to her own intrinsic freedom. Nothing could serve more decisively to heal the disastrous duality, the sense of inward force and outward impotence, which has too long veiled her spirit and thwarted her action.

IV. The next set of questions which call for consideration by a body representative of the world's thought can be summed up under the head of the problem of intellectual freedom.

Here we enter a realm which has served as the battle-

ground for some of the fiercest and most passionate conflicts in history. Far be it from me to add in these brief pages to the libraries that have been written on the relationship between intellectual freedom and the public welfare or, to put it in the most familiar concrete form, between Socrates and the Athenian State, whose youth he appeared to the majority to be corrupting. It is sufficient to admit that each party has right on its side and to draw attention to the ground common to both, a ground fully large enough, if jealously guarded, to protect the interests of learning. Every reasonable man will admit to-day, with the immense output of low-grade printed matter before him, that it is expedient for the public authority to retain, and on occasion to exercise, its control over what is printed or otherwise circulated within its jurisdiction. The general agreement as to the need for the power to restrain obscene publications or other public productions is an obvious example of this. Every man, on the other hand, who has experienced in himself the impulse to think—every civilized man, in other words—will recognize that to restrain or even to discourage in the smallest degree the initiation and expression of disinterested thought is to be guilty of a grave social offence, or—to express it in the language of the Christian religion—to be an accomplice in the sin against the Holy Ghost. Disinterested thought—thought, that is, which is directed towards an ideal object, whether the attainment of intellectual truth in some domain or the intellectual analysis of some practical issue—is the very life-blood of a civilized community. The wisdom of mankind has long since concluded that the evils resulting from an attempt to stifle it far outweigh any temporary inconvenience which may be caused by its diffusion among immature minds. There is no doubt a frontier, difficult to trace on particular occasions, between the intellectual analysis of a practical

issue and the discussion of the action to be taken as a result of such an analysis. This we may readily admit, without entering farther into the thicket thus disclosed. All that we would lay down here, as an axiom with which the learned world would be in unanimous agreement, is that disinterested thought, as above defined, is indissolubly bound up with the very conception of a civilized society and that every effort should be made to promote both its exercise and its expression.

Such efforts must in the nature of the case be mainly negative rather than positive. Men will not think by being told to think, or even by being paid to think. Philosophers, like poets, do not sing their best under persuasion. But what can be done, and should be done, is to analyse and thus to secure the removal of the numerous hindrances that have grown up, particularly in recent years, in the way of freedom of thinking.

The cumulative effect of these obstructions is very considerable. It has, in fact, recently been stated by a good authority that there is less freedom of thought in the world to-day than there was for several centuries before the war. This is no doubt an overstatement; but it is certainly true that there is considerably less freedom of thought than in the middle of the nineteenth century, in spite of the political system that prevailed at that period. By this is not meant that there has been a deliberate conspiracy by governmental or other powers to stifle the world's intellectual life. Far from it. The Governments, almost without exception, set a higher value upon it than they did in the nineteenth century, as is clear from the great and increasingly rapid development in the number and size of universities and other public institutions of learning. The obstacles that have appeared in the way of freedom of thought are there because it was nobody's business to prevent their appearance.

They are due to the fact that the world is ruled by men who understand the necessities of action and are not thereby qualified to understand the necessities of thought. When the thinkers have developed their own corporate organization, there should be little difficulty in making their needs in this respect understood and the appropriate action taken. For it is no more in the interests of the men of action to restrain the quiet processes of thought than it is in the interest of thought to promote upheavals in the world of action.

The analysis of these hindrances will be an intricate and fascinating study. Only two points can be selected here for special mention. The first is the emergence into prominence during the war, and subsequent unhappy survival, of the conception of 'propaganda'. Propaganda is akin to advocacy, but differs from it in this all-important respect—that the advocate is bound by the rules of his profession to devote his intellectual efforts to the defence of a particular cause, whilst the propagandist is employing the same method unprofessionally and under cover. The advocate is thus performing a recognized and very special social function and the fact that his profession is recognized is the safeguard of his integrity. It is a familiar fact that the most skilful advocates often make the best judges.

The propagandist, on the other hand, enjoys no such safeguard. He is an instrument, pure and simple, of the purpose of others. He hires out his mind for use as the chauffeur on the street hires out his swift-moving conveyance. He offers the man of action, unskilled in the processes of persuasion, a short and easy passage to his goal. The influence of propaganda, and of the debased and cynical intellects who employ and produce it, in our modern society is an insidious and virulent poison which has inflicted, and continues to inflict, immeasurable harm upon the world's

intellectual life. How to extirpate it entirely it is not easy to say. The first step, however, is clear—to expose it. Here is a task, disagreeable indeed but urgent, from which a responsible intellectual body, concerned for the integrity of its own standards, would not dare to shrink.

Another matter calling for inquiry is the way in which the very development of the world's intellectual life has reacted unfavourably upon the free expression of opinion by intellectuals. It was lately remarked by a very distinguished student of English education that there had been a noticeable decline in the free debate and discussion, in the newspapers and elsewhere, on which Englishmen have been accustomed for generations to rely for the formation of that all-powerful but undefinable agency, British public opinion. He attributed it in large part to the fact that the men who should be contributing to the debate, the John Stuart Mills, the Carlyles, the Charles Kingsleys, and the rest, are now occupying public or semi-public positions and are thus inclined to be tongue-tied. Whether this judgement is accurate in the particular case we need not stop to inquire. What is certain is that an acute observer here laid his finger upon a process which, in the field of outward organization, is exercising an influence analogous to that exercised by specialization in the world of thought. So many intellectuals have now an institution, a particular loyalty, a 'cause', of their own to absorb them that the number of those for whom 'everybody's business', the business of the republic of learning, comes before their own personal or professional business is seriously diminished. And the care thus necessarily taken to avoid jeopardizing the trust committed to them by engaging in public debate acts as a deterrent, sometimes slight, sometimes all-compelling, against giving their fellow-citizens the benefit of their views on larger matters. Here again there is no

intention to suggest that the chief officer of a university, concerned to set his institution on a sound financial basis, is thereby precluded from being a good citizen, or that he would be subject to opposition or even to inconvenience if he took up the defence of an unpopular cause. In these matters, as every one knows, the issues are not so plain and gross: the balance between prudence and indiscretion is far more finely poised. But that the influences to which attention has been drawn have affected the setting of the scales in such decisions is a fact of widespread significance which would certainly emerge from a careful examination of recent developments and tendencies.

V. We pass to a fifth and last field of investigation which could not be neglected by any representative authority concerned for the maintenance of the highest standard of intellectual life—a series of problems which may be broadly classed under the heading of Commercialization.

We have already spoken of the havoc wrought by the application of scientific method to the art of war and other processes of practical life. To that theme we need not return. What we are concerned with here is the reaction of the development of the applied sciences in these and other directions, upon knowledge itself. Applied 'Science', however far-reaching its activities, however resounding its exploits, is but the outcome of some more basic study. Yet the modern world, eager to seize and turn to advantage inquiries that promise immediate profits, is more and more inclined to ignore the value of the discipline from which they are derived. Thus the very success of Science in interesting the men of action in her operations is proving a source of grave danger to herself. At the very moment when the public is being startled almost daily by some hitherto almost unimaginable triumph of scientific technique, the abstract studies, less dazzling in their appeal, are too

often allowed to languish in poverty and neglect. This is not the place in which to enter into the details of this problem or to recount the complaints, often pathetically modest in their demands, emanating from those responsible, in this or that country, for the fundamental interests of knowledge. Much material on the subject was collected a few years ago on behalf of the League of Nations Committee on Intellectual Co-operation. For the sake of illustration, room may be found, however, for two examples drawn from the inquiry relating to France, a country which, both in its bent for abstract studies and in the social prestige traditionally attaching there to intellectual as against commercial pursuits, would naturally be one of the last to be affected by such influences. The following is a statement by the Dean of the Faculty of Medicine in Paris: 'It is becoming more and more difficult to secure recruits for the laboratories of medical science. In spite of the increase in the salaries offered, there are very few young men to be found who have sufficient devotion to the cause of scientific research to eschew fortune and honours. Human nature will not respond, as yet, to the vocation of penury. There is no difficulty in attracting a sufficient number of keen students to work with the professors of clinical medicine. They stay with them a certain time in order to prepare to practise. . . . But those who stay with the professors of medical science are far fewer, for they require a long technical apprenticeship which involves their spending the whole day in the laboratory. Those of them who, for reasons of livelihood, attempt to engage in practice at the same time, on however small a scale, find it absolutely impossible to carry on serious research. The dilemma is complete. They must either work in an experimental laboratory and renounce the professional advantages of medicine or they must consent to practise and abandon the laboratory. There is no middle

course. This is the reason why we are witnessing in France a real crisis in the study of physiology and experimental medicine.' Very similar is the testimony of the holder of the Chair of Chemistry in the Scientific Faculty at Paris. 'Scientific life in France', he says, 'is limited to a small number of specialists. Pure science does not occupy the important place to which it has a right. The reason is to be found in the small number of situations and the poor salaries offered to first-hand workers.... The result is that, since the war, the laboratories of pure science, and especially those that require a long apprenticeship, as is the case in mineralogical chemistry, have attracted very few students.... Nevertheless, the French public is not indifferent to science; but it gives it practically no support. All that the public understands is its practical applications and it confuses these with Science itself.'¹

The instances here given are by no means the strongest that could have been selected. Medical practice, which is represented as outdoing medical science in its appeal, is far from offering the shining rewards that applied science holds forth in other fields. Yet, when one reflects on what the progress of medical science has meant for humanity, it is impossible to hear of its present difficulties without a profound sense of shame. An authoritative survey, embodying and carrying forward the inquiries already made, into the position and prospects of the basic studies, with special reference to the reaction upon them of commercial influences, is certainly greatly needed. It is likely to reveal that the common belief, according to which the problem is due mainly to after-war conditions, is not well founded, but that

¹ Both the above testimonies are taken from letters addressed to the League of Nations Committee on Intellectual Co-operation in February 1923. They are cited by M. Luchaire in his volume, *Principes de la Coopération intellectuelle internationale* (publication of the Academy of International Law), Paris, 1926, pp. 29-32.

its causes are to be sought in factors far more deeply embedded in the structure of contemporary life.

Before we leave this subject, mention must be made of another range of inquiry which a responsible intellectual body should not shrink from undertaking: a study of the effect of machinery and mechanical devices upon the fine arts. This is a matter of far-reaching and indeed vital importance to the maintenance of the finer values of civilization. Yet it has so far never been authoritatively considered. We know that the photograph, the moving picture, the gramophone, the radio, have become part and parcel of modern life and we are constantly told that they have brought art within the reach of the common man. But we do not observe that this cumulative process of invention has led to any marked outburst of artistic creation or that it has perceptibly affected the quality as opposed to the quantity of aesthetic appreciation. On the contrary, it would seem, at any rate at first sight, as if the countries in which the use of these devices has become most widespread are those in which the public taste is by no means the most finely developed. However this may be, if science has a responsibility regarding the use made of her means of destruction, she has a responsibility also for the application of her discoveries in the field of art. If in some cases these discoveries have become associated with important commercial interests, that is no reason for shrinking from the task of appraising them. On the contrary, it should be an added spur to those who hold that a civilized society should assert its control over influences which so closely affect its intimate welfare. The same may be said in regard to the increasing power of large-scale commercial agencies over the lives of dramatic, musical, and other artists. Problems such as that of a musical executant deprived by a commercial contract of the right to choose his own programmes for a concert tour are as

much the concern of a body dealing with the general interests of intellectual life as the analogous case of a scientific research worker who has signed away his right to decide on the use to be made of his discoveries. Here Art and Profit, Science and Commercial Advantage, are found in unnatural alliance. Neither side is to be blamed for the development of such practices. They are the natural result of the fact that it has hitherto been nobody's business to prevent them.

Here we must leave a subject of which we have touched but the fringe. But enough has been said to show what a wide and important field of work is awaiting a representative intellectual body and how urgent it is that it should be actively undertaken. The survival of civilization depends on the collaboration between Learning and Leadership. But the immediate task of the moment is to evoke such leadership from the ranks of learning itself.

Noblesse oblige.

NOTE

THIS volume is published in the Geneva School series, consisting ordinarily of lectures, or material worked up from lectures, delivered at the Geneva School of International Studies.

Since experience gained in the conduct of the School has been freely used in the following pages, a few words about the School itself may not be out of place.

The Geneva School of International Studies was founded in the belief, growing out of the study of ancient Greece, that what is most needed for the understanding and practical handling of international affairs is neither the development of special disciplines, nor the imparting of information on current events, but a method of approach combining the knowledge and high standard of the specialist with a constant sense of the variety and complexity of the modern world. Uniquely favourable conditions for this combination are to be found at the seat of the League of Nations and it is the aim of the School to make the resources of Geneva as a human laboratory for the study of contemporary world affairs available for serious students of university rank. Its ordinary sessions are held in the summer months beginning eight weeks before the opening of the League of Nations Assembly. The work during these eight weeks consists of short courses of lectures in English or French, followed by discussion, dealing with some aspect of contemporary world affairs. The lecturers consist partly of distinguished scholars and public men from different countries, partly of members of the Secretariat of the League, the International Labour Office, the Institute of Intellectual Co-operation and of various League Committees and Delegations.

The fourth ordinary session was held from 11 July to 4 September 1927. It was attended by 355 students from 36 countries and 130 universities, of whom 184 were of graduate rank. The average period of residence was one month. Of the 77 lecturers, drawn from 20 nationalities, 42 were officially connected with the League of Nations.

During the Sessions of the Assembly a lecture interpreting and commenting on the work of the Assembly is given daily in the morning before the sittings begin by the Director of the School, and there are evening meetings addressed by delegates of the Assembly followed by discussion.

Government scholarships were awarded in 1927 to students attending from Denmark, Poland, Rumania, and the Saar territory. Various scholarships were also awarded to students of individual universities and for students in the various national groups of the International University League of Nations Federation which co-operates closely with the School.

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